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INTRODUCTION 
Purpose 
This thesis proposes to present a systematic inter-
pretation of Plato's theory of Man, using the Republic as 
a core and many of the other dia logues as a ids toward a 
clearer understanding. This is an attempt to reconstruct 
his doctrine of Man from his own writing while .:hegle'c-t.ing 
many f amous interpretations by scholars from the fifth 
century B. C. through the modern era. This paper will not 
be concerned with separate dialogues. More of a synoptic 
account will be given and the chapters will be determined 
according to subject matter a lone. The purpose, therefore, 
is to give unity and shape .to this particular problem. 
Although it is true that Plato's philosophy must be studied 
as a whole before any one theory can be isola ted; this 
thesis is interested in presenting only one aspect of his 
thought. The problem to be discussed forms the center of 
his thought, for he strives to answer in his own way the 
question which perplexed the psal mist: "What is man that 
thou art mindful of him?" . As one moves from dialogue to 
dialogue, the central position which Plato gives to man may 
be discerned. Each work gives a newer, fresher insight into 
the very nature of man. 
1 
The Republic has been selected as the core of this 
thesis because it represents Plato at his best. The earlier 
aialogues are based on Socratic thought and merely pave the 
way to a clearer understanding of man as he is presented in 
the Republic. The dialogues which follow appear to substan-
tiate ?r enlarge upon an aspect of the concept of human 
nature contained in this work. This observation, as all . 
observations, is tentative and may be subject to modifica-
tions. 
The most important factor to keep in mind is that 
it is not the purpose of this thesis to solve the problems 
raised by Plato concerning the nature of man, but rather it 
is to understand them. Grounding in the text, however~ is 
necessary before the basic problems can be grasped; for it 
is far too easy to become subjective and to allow personal 
problems to become Platonic ones. In attempting to present 
a systematic conception of man it has been necessary to 
accept the interpretation which conforms more with logical 
pattern in mind. The Republic supplies the outline and, as 
ha s been said, the other works will be used to give a clearer 
estimation of human nature . To be technical, one cannot say 
that this is lh! meaning of Plato, for he is far too complex 
for such a statement. One can merely say that this is more 
representative of Plato. No final conclusions will be of-
fered that cannot be altered in light of further and varied 
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interpretation. Another difficulty is the manner in which 
Plato philosophizes. One must realize that the dialogue 
which he uses a s a form tends to be dramatic, and his method 
therefore may differ from what he has to say. For i.nstance, 
he speaks of the coherence of knowledge; in fact, he stresses 
it. Yet he is not a systematic thinker himself, His method 
is that of a movement from hypothesis to h~pothesis; his 
mentality is intuitive rather than rational, suggestive 
rather than definitive. 1 
Method Used 
Plato's theory of man is presented as an outgrowth 
of earlier Greek thought, especially that of the Sophists. 
No attempt has been made to separate his thought from that 
of Socrates for two reasons: first, because Plato's earlier 
ideas were so influenced by Socrates tha t they can not be 
distinguished, arid second, because both men were fighting 
the basic problems raised by their opponents, the Sophists. 
(In the s~ction on the "Histori cal Background" the Sophists 
will be discussed.) 
This thesis is divided into chapters according to 
the relationship of man to the universe, man to society, 
man to man, and man to his inner self. Using this appr oach 
one may begin with man as a real part of all that there is 
and discover how he is meta physically related to reality. 
1. Demos, PP, x. 
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Then one oan move on to hie association with a smaller 
un1 t--society. w·hat is man's relation 'to the state? 
'ihy is there a need tor a state'f If there is a s tate, · then 
it must be made up of individuals. If so, then how should 
one individual treat another? Wh)"? Does it give the in-
dividual a personal sort of satista.ctio!l when he lives 
with others , serves others? How doea it affect him as a 
human being? ·hat can he do to become the type of person 
lie shoul d be? These and many other problems will be an-
S\V er•ed in light of the theory ot man as interprete<.i. rrom 
the reading of Plato'· s dialogues. 
Previous Work 
It would be an 1mpoasible taek to enumerate all 
the works that have been done on Plato as a thinker, teach-
er, or artist. Hie dialogues have been translated into 
over tifty languages and are steadily being translated in-
to more. · I am indebted, however, to the following writers 
tor ideas that they have suggested concerning this thesis: 
Raphael Demos, Werner Jaegar, A. E. Taylor, R. Lodge, F. 
Corntord, and John Wild. The Jowett translation of the 
dialogues has been used exclusively except tor the 
Corntord translation and edition of the Republig. 
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CHAPTER I 
. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Before Plato all philosophical speculation was 
prologue. He was the first to see the role of philosa-phy in 
----
the education of a new type of man. The importance of tne 
Pre-Socratics, as the earlier speculators are called, should 
not be underestimated, however.. They must not be treated 
as steps in a continuous process alone, but must be studied 
as individual philosophers in order to appreciate their 
importance. The earlier philosophers cannot, however, de-
mand a position as high as that of Socrates or Plato.· In 
studying one particular problem it is impossible as well as 
irrelevant to discuss the thought of particular men other 
than that part of their thought which is pertinent to the 
issue. 
The poet was the undisputed leader of the people 
during t he age of the Pre-Socratics. Slowly the statesman 
and the law-giver joined him. This situation persisted 
until the time of the Sophists, who were social innovators 
in that they differed from the earlier naturalists and on-
tologists. The Sophists mark the point where philosophical 
speculation set to work to solve the problem of the nature 
of the individual and his relation to the universe. Turning 
5 
again to the poets, it is difficult to see where "mythical 
thinking" in the epic ended and rational thinking began . 
Indeed, rational ideas are interpenetrated in the very con-
tent of mythology. Because such is true, a line cannot be 
dra~n between Homeric and Ionian natural philosophy. View-
ing Greek thought as organic, there is no discontinuity 
between rational and mythical thinking. If Homeric epics 
are analyzed, it ~ill be seen that logic invaded mythology · 
quite early and began to transform it. For instance, 
there is not much difference between Homer's idea that Ocean 
is the origin of all thingsl and Thales' idea that water is 
the basic principle of the universe. Both theories are in-
spired by the tangible reality of water. Again the notions 
of Love and Hate, the two most fundamental emotions which 
are binding and separating forces in the thought of Emped-
ocles have the same ancestry as Hesiod's Cosmogenic Eros. 
It is impossible to say that philosophic thinking began at 
the point where mythological thinking ended. For even in 
Aristotle and especially in Plato there is evidence of 
mythical thinking. This is obvious in Plato's myths of the 
soul and in Aristritle's description of the love that all 
things fu~ve for the unmoved Mover.2,3 
' 
Early Greek thought begins by delving intro the 
mysteries of nature rather than the nature of man. . To 
1. il· ~v, 201 (203), 246. 
2. Jaeger, Arist., pp. 50, 51. 
3. Phad. r ,2lfb--254. 
: ... 
I , ' I 
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explain this fact many scholars have said that the earlier 
thinkers were devoted to knowledge and sought to discover 
the answer to the deepest possible problem, which is the 
problem of Being itself. They were absorbed in the study 
of existence as such. Because of this many anecdotes were 
built up to ridicule these early thinkers. Thales was made 
7 
to fall in a we~ili and be jeered at by his Thracian maid for E= 
desiring to probe in celestial things when he could not see 
what was at his own feet. Anaxagoras is quoted as caring 
nothing for his family and country but pointing to the 
heaven says, "This is my country." Pythagoras was once 
asked why he was living, and he said, "To look at heaven 
and nature." These and like anecdotes serve as illustrative 
of the philosopher's inexplicable interest in cosmology, 
which was cailed meteorology i n those days. They were con-
sidered strange and bizarre by the common people because of 
their scholarly sea rch for the origin of the universe. 
In the sixth century the natural philosophers de-
voted their lives to the study of this problem, or of the . 
QhYsics of the universe. The entire intellectual movement 
was giveri the name of physics as well as the type of think-
ing it created. This concept of physics diff ers from the 
modern idea of it, for such problems today would be termed 
metaphysics. In the Greek conception, however, two concepts 
are confused: the inquiry into the origin of the universe, 
which compels reason to move beyond the phenomenal; and the 
comprehension of everything which proceeds from that origin 
and can be discovered through empirical investigation . l 
It is only natural that the Ionian would be led to ask the 
important question of "how" once they had discovered what 
each held to be the ultimate of the universe. They were 
compelled by their inquisitive nature to extend their know-
ledge of facts and discover the laws which governed natural 
phenomena. The myths, too, were subjected to the caref ul 
scrutiny of scientific thought. Her• is the emergence of 
true philosophical thought. 
In supplying the historical background of Platonic 
thought the Orphic movement must be added to the stream of 
early Greek thought. It exemplifies the search for a higher 
meaning of life, "it resembles the attempt of logical thought 
to establish a philosophical f oundation for the rule-~ 
mora l law throughout the cosmos."2 Its teachings were not 
the cause of its great i nfluence; rather the Orphic movement 
gave a new feeling for human life. Herein ' lies the begin-
ning of a new consciousness of the self with a definite 
moral tinge. Because of its mora l significance, it differed 
gr eatly from the Homeric conception of the soul. It taught 
tha t the soul should be kept pure i~ its earthly existence 
because it comes f r om God and does not perish. A believer 
in such a creed feels obligated for life and feels respon-
1. Jaegar, Paideia, 153. 
2. Jaegar, Paideia, 164. 
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ible for the purity of his soul. Their doctrine continued 
is that the soul is the highest and best p3rt of man. 
Because careful investigation had revea led to man that there 
is a ceaseless cycle of birth and decay, that mighty nature 
did not car e for such a puny crea ture as man but far trans-
cended their brief happiness with its iron justice, men 
turned to belief in their divine destiny. The soul became 
a stranger in this world and longed for its eternal home. 
The Orphic conception of the soul marks a definite 
advance in man's concept of selfhood. Without it Plato 
could never have develope · the theory that human nature is 
divine and that man's sensual nature can be separated from 
his true self which he ~hould perfect. Empedocles in his 
philosophy syn~hesizes the Orphic conception of the divine 
in man ·.with the philosophical explanations which had been 
advanced. He very clearly shows how these two seemingly 
opposed views could supplement and complete each other. He 
symbolizes the union of the two in his image of the soul 
which is tossed up and down in the whirl of the elements--
air, water, earth, and fire. In the cosmos interpreted by 
the physicists the soul can find no place; only when the 
soul can make a place for itself in the philosopher's cos-
mos, as in Heraclitus, can man be content with a theory of 
metaphysics. 
The cosmological theories of the early Ionians were 
pure, disinterested research without reference to human life. 
9 
Slowly philosophical investigation turned inward to exami ne 
the nature of humanity, as the whole cosmos gradua lly fo-
cussed on the study of man, as this problem became mor e and 
more central in philosophical thought. Even Democritus was 
unable to exclude from his severely logical explanation of 
the universe the problem of man and man's moral world . He 
avoided the solutions, however, and chose t o separate e th ics 
from na tural philosophy . His ethical theory was expanded in 
t he old-fashioned form of oarainesis, moral exhor t at i on, and 
became a peculiar mixture of traditional maxims and the 
scientific and rationalistic s pirit of philosophy. These 
and other attempts to bring the t wo worlds--world of na ture 
and world of man--together are symptoms of the growing im-
portance of the new philosophica l problem of human lif~. 
' 
The increasing concentration of philosophy on prob-
lems of human existence made it historically impossible f or 
the Sophist s not to arise. They came i nto existence, however, 
to meet a practical and not a theore t ical need. That is the 
basic reason why they had such a strong influence in Athens. 
They were founders of educational science . They called 
their theory of education an art, however, and not a science. 
In Pla t o we have a detailed account of Protagoras' view of 
the subject. They could not understand philosophy as di-
vorced from life. They were the heirs of the educational 
tradition of the poets, and their proper place in the his-
tory of Greece cannot be grasped until they ar e assigned a 
10 
position in the history of Greek culture. The Sophists 
regarded Homer as the encyclopaedia of 11 human knowledge 
and a s a mirid of prudentia l wisdom for the conduct of lif e. 1 
They thought the poets immedia t e ly and timelessly pres ent 
and discussed them as if they lived today. However, t hey did 
not pr oclaim the educational traditions of poetry alone be-
cause they also created much of their own. They dealt with 
all conceivable pr oblems both varied and new. They ·were 
influenced by science, pol i tics, re ligion, and such influ-
ences and were very proud of their knowledge . Pla t ·o is 
never tired of parodying and ridiculing their exaggerated 
self-conceit. Many of them c ombined the functions of scho-
lar, orator, teacher, and l i tterateur. It was impossible 
to place them in any one trade or position. Heppias o-f 
Elis, who was conversant in all areas of knowledge , knew all 
trad es, \'lore no garment which he had not made himself, was 
a perfect hQmQ universale. 2 
The Sophists were important because they made Greece 
cognizant of her own culture. At a time when Greek tradi-
ti ons were breaking down they realized that culture was t he 
great duty which falls to the lot of the nation. This way 
they discovered the aim of the development of the pe~ple 
and the basis of every kind of social organization. However, 
the r ealization may be best described in Hegel's terms when 
1. Rep. 598 d. 
2. Hipp. Min., 368b ~ 
11 
\ 
he said that Minerva's owl did not begin her flight until the 
dusk had fallen. 
Not enough is known about the Sophists to give a 
detailed and individual account of their teachings and pur-
poses. They were heralders of the day and wrote for the ay 
in which they lived. Hence their works did not survive the 
time . They l a id great str ess upon the differences among 
themselves, as is shown by Plato 's contra sting de scriptions 
of the Sophists in the ~rotaRoras. However, it is known 
that the Sophists directed study to the body of man ns a 
physical organism. Man is subject to certain rules pr e-
scribed by his own nature, and these rules must be known if 
he is to live a happy or contented life. They began with an 
optimistic belief that man's inner na ture is capable of 
being educa ted and the bad man is an exception. Of course, 
this is a point where Socrates and the Sophists meet . Pro-
tagora s, the most famous of the Sophist s , st r es sed education 
and gave it a wide and deep founu3 tion. Education is not a 
simple automatic process, but it is ~ore of a soul shaping. 
This notion is explicit in Protagoras' assertion that the 
harmony and rhythm of poetry and music must be impressed 
upon the soul to make it rhy t hmical and ha rmonious. 
The Sophists are also very important to philosoph~ 
ical thought--not because of any great meta physical contri-
bution but because they made it possible for the development 
of such grea t minds as those of Socrates and Plato. Socrates 
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and Pla to directed all their energies toward defeating the 
Sop:.ists, who decla red tha t the natural standar of human 
conduct is utility, ultimately enjoyment or pleasure. They 
asse r ted that each man determined what was best for hi mself 
according to the amount of pain or pleasure it gave him. 
This extreme r ela tivism led to the forma tion of the f amous 
statement by Protagoras ., "Man is the measure of all . things." 
The views of the Sophists on man~ the sta te, and 
t he universe lack the seri ousness of t he earlier philosoph-
ers4 Yet it would be wrong to judge their achievements in 
the fields of ethics and metaphysics alone. Their greatest 
contribution t o Greek culture wa s in the field of formal 
education. Their weakness wa s in the intellectual and moral 
foundations of their teaching, but they are not to be j ud ged 
too harshly for this because it was indicative of the times 
in which they lived. i·n It is only natural t hat such an era in 
history i n which jndivi dualism is s tressed ~el~tivism 
should arise along with an unparalleled demand for educ tion 
and a lso tha t talented educators should arise to fulfill the 
need. 
The fourth centur y, however, wa s a ful r ilment of the 
promise of the fifth. It wa s an age of tremendous r evolu-
.tion in which equality wa s based on law. The people only 
enj oyed listening t o standards and contents for less and 
less a ttention was paid to them~ Plato, the grea test t hinker 
of his day, san t he dif iculty in building up society and 
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t~e State mor e clearly than anyone else and took up the 
challenge. Over the fourth century lies the shadow of col-
• . l apse which sends off a bright ray and slowly fades away. 
·- Plato the man must be seen in such a setting where the very 
founda tion of his socia l and political world was shaken. 
Af ter thirty years of war Athens fell and the most glorious 
~olitical structure ever built crumbled. The Greek wor ld 
was convulsed by her f ate. The moral and political reper-
cussions were felt by all . because life in the ci t y stat e had 
been so c losely connected with t hat of the government. I t 
was f ar more than merely political; it shook all moral laws 
and struck at the roots of religion. Because of this t he 
fourth century was an age of constant endeavor at internal 
and external reconstruction. It wa s because of inner con-
flicts and suffering that the Greek spirit turned inward 
upon itself. The Greeks believed in ord er to relieve the 
suff ering they must change the ·world. This is the place where 
Plato fully expresses his theory of man. Only through man 
would t his change be possible. Plato rea lized this and 
arranged his thought to include the proper education that 
would allow man to surpass himself and to improve the world 
in which he lives. Why should such a t a sk fall upon man? 
What is his relation to reality which allows him to trans-
cend the world and t hus improve it? These and oth~r ques-
tions will be fully answered in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE METAPHYSICAL PLACE OF MAN IN THE COSMOS! 
AS A SOU!. 
Before one can understand events about :man, it is 
necessary to understand his , own nature and purpose. For 
this rea son it is necessary to begin a discussion of man by 
analyzing his inner na t~re, designated as soul by Plato. 
Of all things which a man has, next to the gods ~ 
his soul is the most divine and most truly his own 
. . . and in our opinion he ought to honor he r sec• 
ond only to the gods • • . even in life yhat makes 
each of us what we are is only the soul. 
A sigh whispered in the da rk gazing at a starry sky, 
a seeking for knowledge in books of ancient wisdom, a yec rn-
ing "to be or not to be"--why? Man overwhelmed by his min-
uteness when surveying as far as the eye can see and t he 
mind can comprehend, man mystified when seeking to discover 
the fathomless depth of his inner being, man looking at man 
with a wondering air because he varies in all de grees--
between beast and god, foolish and wise, ugly and beautiful--
and asks how sh~ll I regard them with hostility and antagon-
ism, condescension and tolerance, love and affection, or 
with righteousness and justice--why? Each man in his own 
1. ~' 959. 
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peculiar way, be it sighing , seeking, or yearning, de si~e~ 
an answer to one question: where .do I fit in? Do I belong? 
Is man an intruder or fugitive from another world 
resting he r e awhile before he journeys on? Or is he here by 
chance--a mere result of chemical reaction under favorable · 
conditions? Perhaps he was created to be a plaything of 
the gods, who delight in his efforts to free himself from 
the web of life. Pla to answers nay to these and like as-
sertions. Man is no strange r , intruder, or victim of chance; 
he is related to the cosmo s and has a specific purpose to 
f ulfill. His real or inner self allies him with the e~~rnal 
and the passing; it causes and does the sighing, seeK:Iri-g , 
yearning; it alone can find the sense of belonging to the 
unive r se, to the race of mankin d , and most important of ~1, 
only the soul can discover its true worth because only the 
soul can know itself. 
Before one can unde r stand events about him, it is 
necessary to know something of his own nature and purpose. 
For this reason it is necessary to begin a discussion of 
man by analyzing his inner nature. 
No meaningful interpretation of Plato's concept of 
the soul can be given without discus s ing his meaning of 
~· The best discussion is f ound in t he SYffiposium. The 
Symposium is the most perfect of all Plato's di a logues; it 
is more than that his art reaches its height. No words 
could possibly do it justice, whether one is analyzing or 
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paraphrasing the language. All t hat can be done i s to mark 
its main theme and relate it to Plato's concept of the s oul. 
By the title of the work Plato shows that this dialogue dif-
fers from most of his others because i t does not have a cen-
tral character. Platogave the discussion of~ a very 
appropria te set ting by his selection of t ime and scene. From 
the earliest time, the symposium meant to the Greeks the 
milieu where honors were celebrated in poetry and song . 
This may be found true in Romer and Xenophanes, as well as 
the aristocratic educational maxims of Theognis sung at 
banquets . Pla to, however, was the founder of a ne\..r philo- · ·· 
sophical form of the sy@posium. His symposia became one .of 
the re gular meeting places of t he teacher and pupil. The 
many works of post-Platonic Greek li t erature bearing the 
word " symposium" in their title bear witness of the change 
in meaning and the exi~tence of t he philosoph1cal spirit 
bringing deeper and richer prcblems. 1 
In Plato's thinking and writing , it is possible to 
ascertain two methods. His work represents an a ttemp~ to 
obtain ideals of universal validi ty and a lively awareness 
of all t he concrete facts of life in which he i s living. · 
Both concepts can be traced to thinkers before Plato and be-
fore his concept of~ can be understood, one must under-
stand the background. Plato was deeply impressed by two 
1. Jaegar, Paideia, 176. 
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thinkers, and he struggled throughout his life · to reconcile 
the thought of the two. In the Symeosium he believed that 
he had succeeded . The two thinkers we r e Heraclitus, a phil-
osopher of change, and Socra tes, a seeker ·of universal 
ideals. 
Heraclitus represents the humanizing of philosophi-
cal problems. Before his time the Ionians, Milesians, and 
Eleatics had cont ented themselves with purely unbia sed na-
tura listic interpretations of the cosmos. Although Heracli-
tus was greatly influenced by t heir thought and other ob-
jective conceptions of the universe, he never lost sight of 
the human life in t he vast pattern of nature. He held that 
the human soul with a ll its sufferings and emotions was the 
center of the energies of the cosmos. N t ure could be known 
only through the words and deeds of men because they were 
t he inst ·uments through which nature worked . He wa s the 
first to seek a place fe r man in the struggling univer·se 
which paradoxically is a sea of Being and Becoming . 
Heraclitus opened a vast new area of knowledge to the 
human mind when he said, uTravel over every road, you cannot 
discover t he frontiers of the soul--it has so deep a lo-gos.nl 
By this he meant that an entirely new realm of knowledge 
could be discovered if the soul would turn and ccntemplate 
upon herself . This inner self is of a deeper and more 
1. Called to attention by Jaegar, Paid. , I~ 179 (Frag. 45). 
18 
mystifying nature than the grand cosmos herself. No other 
t hi nker befor e Socra tes ba d awakened such a keen interest 
in t he inner self a s Heraclitus had. He stands at the ve ry 
pinnacle of the freedom of Ionian thought when he said , "I 
s ought for myself." This is the highest expression of 
selfhood that had been uttered. 
Heraclitus• conception of selfhood is embodied in 
Plato's conception of the soul. By seifhood Heracl,itus 
meant the idea of the logos which knows its own seft ·-and 
place in the universe. Here within the new cosmos which his 
predecessors had discovered, Heraclitus gave man as the 
logos a central place. However, to live as a cosmic being 
it is necessary t o obey the cosmic laws. Life as such is 
much more than existence; it enta ils the r elationship with 
the universe in its entire t y. All is one, but the one is a 
ma trix of tensions and compulsions, change and identit y. 
The self, the world, t he cosmos has its begi nning from oppo-
sites. Thr~ugh the struggle with the opposite life i s pos-
sible. 
I t rest s by changing. Living and dead, waking and 
sleeping, young and old are a t bottom one and the 
same . This changes, and t~at is that; and that 
changes again and is this . . 
For He r aclitus man is a part of the cosmos as all else is. 
As such he must obey the cosmic law of change a s a ll other 
parts do. Man differs f r om other parts of the cosmos in 
1. Frag. 88. 
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that he is able to obtain wisdom. Through its kinshi p with 
the "ey.erlasting f ire," the soul is ca pable of knowing di-
vine trut h . 
Pla to was greatly influenced by this doctrine of 
change as expounded by Heraclitus of Cra tylus. When_ he was 
very young he attended some of Cratylus' lectures and was 
swept away with the Heraclitean flow. Then he met Socrates 
and a new world ·became visible to him. Socrates spoke of 
mora l problems in which he discussed the eternLty of 
essences such as the Good, the Just, and the Beautiful. At 
this point Plato did not know what t o think. He was so im-
pressed by the Heraclitian idea of change that he could not 
join in with Socrates' de termined search f ·or a fixed point 
in the ethical world. Conf usion suddenly cleared away and 
·Plato di scove r ed harmony i n doctr.iines he once thought to ·be 
mutually exclusive. Both Heraclitus and Socrates were 
right! Each was speaking of diff erent worlds. Heraclitus 
spoke of t he phenomenal world which we know t hrough exper-
ience. It was all so pl in to him then and he continued 
throughout his life to hold this view regarding the sensible 
world. But Socrates was looking for a different sort of 
reality which did not flow but was truly "is." His was a 
search for the immutable and eternal which transcended the 
phenomenal. Socrates introduced Plato to universal concepts 
which composed the world of true being. The essences which 
could be grasped only by thought were named Ideas by Plato 
20 
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and placed in a separate world apart from the world of 
sense. 
Socrates spoke of the excellence of the soul, too, 
and added something new. He ca lled the soul pslche in ·such 
a tone tha t reverence was added to the passionate and tre-
seeching urgency which he expressed. Rhode in his great 
book Pslche passes over the importance of Socrates' thought 
in the development of Greek spirit. This may be justifiable 
on the grounds that Socrates made no essential contribution 
to the realms of thought conce~ning the cult of the dead or 
immortality. However, as Burnet points out in a very fine 
article in which he traces the development of the -soul in 
-----Greek history, neither the Homeric and epic eidon, th.:; ·-. 
shades in Hades, nor the air-s_:~ul of the Ionic phi'lo-S-O.t>hers, 
nor the soul-daemon of Orphic belief, nor the psyche of 
Attic tragedy can explain the new meaning of soul given by 
Socrates. 1 He attributes to the soul a peculiar spiritual 
emotion which has influenced the Ghristian conception very 
- r 
much. This statement must no~ b~e \tio construed as to thtnk 
Socrates was a Christian thin~e·r ~ , as many early church fath-
ers asserted. His thought def,i~~tely was Hellenic in ori-
/ ' \ -
gin. Anc;log,ies and preliminar~ - stfges to his teaching can 
J •. • . \ 
be poin'Q'ed; QU~ \n the Orphic a~R · Di\,nysian cults. Socrates 
was a hard , th1.n}s:er, I . 
I -. '\ 
a high degre,; · \ 
I , 
' I 
:r ' 
however, an~ midified these concepts to t. 
'\ 
'-,, 
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1. Burne't, fArb..., 1930,236. / 
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Socrates emphasized the inner life by saying that 
the soul is the highest source of values in .human lif~. He 
gave no definite outline of it as Plato did, but contented 
himself with singing its praises. Virtue and hap piness be-
came qualities of t he spirit which could be mirrored by the 
body. His g eatest contribution to the Platonic conception 
of the soul is that one should care for the soul. By this 
he did not mean what the Christians asserted, nor d.id he 
mean that the soul should be separated from the body. n 
the contrary, he believed that one could not properly c · re 
for the soul ·unless the b6dy too was cared for. Both needed 
treatment; one could have a sick soul as well as a sick 
body. The duty of the soul was not to separate itself from 
the body but to control the body instead. Self-control as 
such must be developed through proper exercise and proper 
food. The proper exercise was practical thinking grounded 
in the dialectic; proper food was learning. 
Plato's problem wa s to connect the two worlds which 
he sincerely believed in. The question was how. How c ould 
he reconcile these two worlds i n one coherent system of 
thought? Herein lies the seed of his conception of the soul 
as ~· . 'Metaphysically there was need for an entity which 
could tie the two r ealms together. There was need for some 
' principle qf betweenness, some mediator, to bring the world 
of appearance and the world of_values together. All these 
requirement$ werE met in Plat~'s conception of~· 
i 
I 
i 
I 
I 
\ 
·\ 
\ 
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If the highest conception of ~ is taken to be 
man 1 s instinctive urge t o develop his mvn h.;igher s-elf ~ t hen 
~ can be declared to be one of the basic charact~~istics 
of the soul. ~is born f r om man's metaphysica l yearning 
aft er t he wholeness which is forever impos s ible to the i n-
divi dual nature. This yearning shows man t o be mere ly a 
fragment a lways striving to be reunited with its appropria te 
other self a s long as he exists i n helpless separ a tion . 1 It 
represents the striving of the soul for Truth, Wisdom, 
Beauty, and Goodness. In other words, it is that which 
gives direction to live and leads as Demos suggested to more 
lif e and better life. Self-perfection, however, can be ob-
ta i ned only in relation to s omething else or someone else 
who will conplement t he powers which need comple tion. This 
is illus t rated in the speech made by Aristophanes when he 
indi rectly indica tes that there i s something else beside s 
sexual union which makes partners desire to remain together 
forever. Wha t ever it is they cannot say; t he soul of each 
want s something from the other which is i wpossible to name. 
~became an epitome of all human striving to 
obtain the Good . It is a yearning for wholeness and per-
fection voiced by an incomple te and imperfect be i ng . As such 
it is not an idea l or a form, but a part of the nature of man 
whi ch makes it {ro ?sible for eternal life. For ~ is i n-
terpreted as the love for the Good, and at the same time it 
1. Symp., 187d-e. 
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i s the urge of human nature toward self-fulfillment. In 
f act it is what Plato means by philosophy: the yearning of 
the true self to take shape within us . This yearning for 
the good entails t he desire to possess the -good f orever. 1 
I t is the a s pi rati on of the man ':Jho knmi s he is still imper-
feet to mould his own spir it and reason vJith his ga ze stead-
ily fixed on t he Ideas . 
The type of desire or activity which dese r ves t he 
n me of~ is the urge to proc r eate, whether it be biolog-
ical , socia l , or spiritual . There is f irs t the desire to 
have an offspring by a beautiful person . 2 (The ~latonic 
meaning of beaut y will be given whi l e discussing the ladder 
of beauty7 of love .) Thi s strike s one as being strange in 
the very beginning because it seems to be confined · to the 
body . The attractiveness of the body does have its function 
in thi s t heory, but it is second3ry t o the inward beauty 
which belongs to the soul . There is a strong desire within 
man to have somecne like himse l f to l eave behind. This 
represents the meaning of lll2.2, as a phy sic ~-:. 1 impul se, the 
i mpulse of our bodies to be immor t a1 .3 There is a l so the 
desire to perpetuate oneself in the onward flow of the life 
of the community through some heroic deed or creative act. 
Phaedrus said that men died for wha t they loved i n order to 
1. Symp. , 206a . 
2. ~' 206f . 
3. ~' 208a - b . 
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be remembered for their valiant deeds. 1 
Socrates proposes t o show that the soul as eros ha s · 
-
additional virtues. He synthes i zes all that had been said 
before in the speech he bases on Diotima's knowled ge of l ove. 
Accord i ng to Diot ima , !!£!cannot be given positive charac-
teristics. It is the desire for something 'vhich is last i ng. 
It yearns for beauty, completion, perfection ; hence, it 
cannot be beautiful, complete, or pe r fect. It stands be-
tween beauty and ugliness, wisdom and ignorance, perfection 
and i mperfection, mortality and immortality, be tween celes-
tial and ear t hly realms. Here the gap between the world of 
Ideas and the world of a ppear ances is closed . To use 
Nietzsche's ~erm, the soul becomes a "bridge." It is the 
1,: 
bond , the sfridemos that binds t he whole universe together. 
'I Thus man b~comes the centra l fi gure in the cosmos. He i s a 
part of t." o realms binding them together in a unique fashion 
/ tfl 
by forei er strivi ng to bec ome perfect as the Idea s are 
' I ; I 
perfe'ctL 
' i 
I 
/ I How is it possible to attain this perfection? Love 
' I 
J i 
is t1fe key , g.iven to Socrates by Diotima. Love is a form of 
rl· 
eroi tand as ~uch it is forever partnered with want, yet 
--;Jl '\ o~jrt1~owing ~i th r :iLches. 2 Using the human being a s an ex-
ample ~ beca~s-~ here ~ re aches its highest expression' 
Dioti'fla desc'f' ib,es the va r i ous stages which a re necessary 
' .. 
'. } 
' \ 1. S)ffilp., 179. \ 
2. Sfll\p. , 203c-e . 
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before the feeling of wholeness which the individua l yearns 
for is attainable. These stages have been referred to by 
many scholars as the ladder of Love or Beauty . 
. begins in early youth w!.1(;n the physical beauty of another is 
admired and desired. 1 Then the youth realizes that there are 
many beautiful bodies, and the dependence upon the one beau-
tiful person that he admires dwindles away. This does not 
mean that he contents himself with love affairs with every 
beautiful person who will allow it, but it means that he is 
beginning to a ppreciate beauty in itself. Next, he begins 
to no t ice a spiritual beauty which is not as common as 
physica l beauty. .This type being of a more endur i ng f orm, 
he gives it a higher position. He comes to prefer the charms 
of the inner self more than the outward beauty, even when the 
spirit is i n an unattrac tive body. 2 (As Alcibiad es' love 
for Socra tes even when he likened him to the statuettes of 
Silenus which wer e sold :l.r: art shops. When the se. statuettes, 
ugly a s they were, we r e opened, images of gods were within 
them.) The emphasis here is transferred from outward beauty 
to inward loveliness. At this stage,~ t akes, on an edu-
cational character and brings for th speeches deS.J:;J~ned to 
imprC?ve the appreciation of the young. 3 It move,s. upward to 
r ecogni ze t he beaut y of all sciences and all knowledge. He 
' I 
I 
1:. Symp.·. , 210a '. 
? . Symp. , 210b .. 
~· Symp., 210e. 
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realizes that t hey are a part of the Beautiful which is 
above and beyond all ~ndividual phenomena and relationships.l 
Plato does not mean that one lives for one trance-
like aesthetic moment when all particular beauties are ab-
sorbed in the essence of Beauty. Instead he maintains that 
the only lif e worth living is spent in perpetual contempla-
tion of the eternal Beauty. 2 This does not imply a static 
conditi on of the soul at all, which is lacking in complete-
ness. Diotima had defined ~ as the desire to make the 
Good one's own forever, which indicates the possession of a 
lasting state throughout life. Plato refers to this state 
a s "divine beauty," or "lasting beauty," which he identifies 
with the Good. He goes on to say that Beauty and the Good 
are two closely allied aspects of the same reality. Beauty 
and Goodness are pure states which are the highest principles 
of human action as well as the ground of all that happens in 
nature. For Plato believes that there is perfect harmony 
between the individual and the cosmos, morality and the un~-
ve r se. This concept of ~ is his attempt t o bring to-
gether the two realms t alked about i n the theories of Hera-
clitus and Socra tes. 
If the interpretation that ~ is the yearning to 
make the Good one's own forever is correct, then eternal 
beauty and goodness must be within the very heart of the 
1. Symp., 210d-e. 
2. Symp. , 2llc. 
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individual, urging him onward, driving him forward. But 
this does not answer the negative, degrading aspects of 
human nature. This accounts only for the construction of 
personalities such as Socrates, but leaves out weaklings 
and tyrants. Further reading in the Phaedrus and the 
ReQublic confirms such doubts. ~may be the basic drive 
within the soul, but it is not all of it. If this were not 
true, then there would be no difference between individuals. 
What is the principle of differentiation in souls? 
First we must inquire into the nature of the self as such. 
The best interpretation of the soul can be given by using 
the myth of the charioteer which Plato used in the Phaedn1s. 1 
Without such an analogy the interpretation will overlook 
some of the important factors. "Let the life of the indi-
vidual be likened to the indwelling mobile power of a winged 
yoke of horses and a charioteer. 112 As Wild reminds us, 
attention is ca lled at once to the wings.3 The wings domin-
ate the speech made by Socrates in this passage. Their role 
is due to the fact that without their aid the chariot drawn 
by two stee4s could never possibly ascend to the celestial 
realm where the gaze of the charioteer is fixed . The wings 
do not belong to either of the stee s nor the charioteer 
alone. They rather belong to the uniting power of the whole 
1. Phaedr. , 246a--257. 
2. Phaedr., 246a-b. 
3. Wild, PTM, 148. 
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vehicle, as the individual who loves loves with his whole 
being and not with a part. However, they are mor~ closely 
united with the charioteer than with any of the other parts, 
because he through careless driving can smash the wings and 
ground the vehicle. Under more skillful driving the chariot 
can rise to the upper region, a s the lover who sees the in-
ward beauty rises beyond the attractions of phenomena . Thus 
driver and wings depend upon each other. He embodies the 
concept of reason which guides the chariot and prevents the 
conf usion which would ensue without his intervention. But 
what would cause such confusion? 
The chariot is drawn by two steeJs who could QG±y 
by their own power move the vehicle but could never raise 
it off the ground. Without a trained driver, the more 
powerful horse would take control and pull the chariot 
around and around. Soon the weaker horse would rebel and 
decide to go his own way. By such constant interference the 
motion of the entire vehicle is impeded, the wings are 
crushed, and the vehicle is grounded. This situation could 
be averted by the skillful driver. The meaner animal must 
be beaten into submission1 and he will then follow the able 
stee~ to a position where ascent is possible. The horses, 
as the driver, have power independent of each other. They 
Cdn react at will to any temptation, but will be les s likely 
1. Phaedr. , 254e. 
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to do so if they are properly disciplined . There is t he 
power of the meaner horse who see s only what is before him . 
Aspiration ha s no meaning for hfm and he can onl7 be trained 
to stand in fear before it. 1 The better steeddoes not have 
a vision which is much longer, but he respec ts the driver 
and becomes responsive to what he cannot see. The- driver 
sees what the horses see and more. His gaze is fixe d on 
eternal things and he sets his goa l in that direction. 2 
This myth is int erpreted for us in Book IV of the 
Republic. The existence of the tripartite division of t he 
soul--reaso~, splrat,appetite--is established by an analysis 
of the conflicts of motives. The illustration of a thirsty 
man is used to make clearer t his concept of the soul. He is 
held in check by the reflect i on that the drink would be bad 
for him. Here a t least two forces are at work, one urging 
the man to drink and the other restraining him. The element 
which encourages him onwar d sees only the i mmediate results, 
as the meaner steeJ saw only what was before him; but the 
reflec t ive element refuses to allow this urge to t riumph; in 
t his opposition reason controls desire through discipline. 
There is a thi rd element, which is designated as the spiri-
tual one, which enters at this time. This factor t akes the 
side of reason and may be praised or r ebuked by rea son. 
These three factors are not independent enti~ies, as may be 
1. Phaedr., 254e. 
2. Phaedr. , 554b. 
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-thought, but are necessary components ·of the soul. They re-
present three forms of desire with the characteristic objects 
of wisdom, honor, and satisfaction of bodily desire.l Here 
are three distinct but inseparable factors which include 
rational planning, long range endeavor or seeking, ~nd 
momentary appeasement. In the actual living of life indiv-
idualism is possible because of the varied degree of influ-
ence of each element of the soul upon the other. The high-
est type of life toward which man aspires can be lived only 
when the soul is controlled by reason which has . through 
training gained rational insight into the perman~nt struc-
ture of the universe and life in the world. 
It has been shown that all the diverse st·rands of 
the universe meet in the soul. The soul as such must pos-
sess a fixed character and identity to exist at all. Of 
the origin and fate of the s oul, no one can be sure. 
Plato's accounts of the beginning and destiny of the soul 
are vague and confusing because he does so in a poetic form 
with the use of myths. The soul is the primary factor of 
experience and can only be explained by some transempirical 
f actor. Plato may be interpreted to have believed that a 
definite number of souls were created by God in cooperation 
with the eternal patterns and the receptacle. 
1. ~ee., IV, 439. 
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It is certain, however, that he believed these souls 
t o be immortal. The ba sic proof which he gives for its i m-
mortality in the Republic rests upon its kinship t o the 
eternal Ideas. The soul cannot be destroyed by any external 
force, only by its own viciousness. As Socrates said: 
Everything i s destroyed by its own peculiar evil 
or corruption; or if that will not destroy it, 
there is at aoy rate nothing else that can bring 
it to an end.l 
The general trend of Plato's arguments for the immortality 
of the soul may be said generally to follow this pattern: 
if the soul cannot be destroyed by its own illn~ss, which is 
vice, then it cannot be destroyed at all. He does not even 
consider that the life of the ~oul may depend on the life of 
the body. He is more interested in the soul as a repository 
of moral values than he is in its pyscho-physical aspect. 
Plato is sure that the soul can never appear in its 
perfect form in this world. It is too much like "the sea-
god Glaucus, whose original form can hardly be discerned, 
because parts of his body have been broken off or crushed 
and altogether marred by the waves, and the clinging over-
growth of weed and rock and shell has made him more like 
some monster than his natural self."2 We cannot comprehend 
its true nature unless its love of nature is comprehended. 
Plato goes on in the myth of Eurto give a picture of 
1. Rep., X, 610. 
2. Rep., 6llc~d. 
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the destiny of the soul after death. The emphasis, however, 
is not on judgment or punishment. Instead he stresses the 
choice of lives made by the souls after their years of wan-
dering. The doc t rine of the wandering of the soul after 
death, taken over from Orpic traditions, enables Plato to 
make clearer the moral responsibility of man. 
Here he attempts to reconcile the old Greek idea of 
I!!.l;ira .. , , in which life is determined by the Fates from birth 
to death, with the nearer idea of free choice.l The con-
ce ption of free choice appears quite early in Plato's work 
in reference to right action. 2 Both elements, necessary and 
free choice, play their parts in the game of life. The 
climax comes in the Republic when the Interpreter tells the 
souls: 
No guardian spirit will cast lots for you, but you 
shall choose your own destiny. Let him to whom the 
first lot falls choose first a life to which he will 
be bound of necessity. But Virtue owns no master; 
as a man honors or dishonors her, so shall he have 
more of her or less.
3 
The blame is his who chooses; 
Heaven is blameless. 
With these words the Interpreter scattered the lots at their 
feet. Once the choice was made it was irrevocable. Immedi-
ately crying and wails of complaint filled the air as the 
souls made poor selections. Plato makes the point clear in 
l.Rep.,6l?e. 
2. Appears first in Apol. 39a and Crito 52c, where he is 
talking of Socrates as a perfect example of making a choice 
that affects ones entire life. In Prat. 356e and Georg. 
499e it appears as a philosophical problem. 
3. Rep., 617d-e. 
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several instances that the choice of soul made depends a 
grea t deal upon the previous lif e of the selector. One 
soul chose the lif e of a swan, another a nightingale, one 
a lion's life, and another a life of athletic honor. Only 
Odysseus, after his manifold experience chose not a life of 
glory, suffering, and action, but a new life, which was 
lying ab out not being observed--that of a man living in 
quiet retirement. He had learned that wealth, glory, fame 
did not mean happiness anymore than their opposites. The 
middle life, as always, is best. 1 The conclusion can be 
drawn that the fundamental purpose of the soul is to live 
so that it may make t he right decision in a later life. The 
greatest danger each person faces is that he may choose the 
wrong pat t ern of life. There fore, man must seek out the 
knowledge which enables him to do this and neglect another. 
The first question of life directed by ~ is to discover 
the Good. Once the concept of the Good becomes concrete, 
then a life of correct decision can be lived. 
1. Rep., 620c. 
CHAPTER III 
MAll AND TO GOOD LIFE 
'lhe Ia ture of Good 
The Good holds a central position in the philosophi-
cal thought of Plato. It is not only the moat outstanding 
principle in ethics, it forma e.lso the bases or his metaphy-
sics, theory or knowledge, theory or art, and theology. 
Reither his conception or the universe, society, man, nor 
the mora l order can be tully understood apart from the Pla-
tonic conception or the Good . In this idea the ultimate 
standard or values and the ultimate standard or being are 
conJoined. 
Important as the conception or the Good . is and cen-
tral as it is to his philosophy, Plato does not ,g1Te a sys-
tematic presentation or it in any or his writings. '!'here 
are many scattered references to the Good in his Dialogues, 
especially in the Republic !!t and !!i, the Philebus, and 
the Timaeua. Even in the named Dialogues, the idea ot the 
Good never becomes more than a hint ot what might be. Xn 
discuasing this concept, the most to be hoped for is a clear-
er understanding or what Plato was attempting and a recogni-
tion or the basic problems i .nvolved which contribute to the 
vagueness and confusion of the conception or the Good. 
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It ia important to be as clear as possible when dis-
cussing this concept and not become lost in the contusion. 
With this in mind; the first step is to realize that Good re-
fers to value in general and not moral value in particular. 
Moral value is aerel7 one particular instance or value. The 
Good is being treated as a metaphrsioal entitr first and as 
a theory of value, secondly. 
The central metaphrsioal concept ot Plato i .s the 
Idea of the Good. The Good itself is the First Form. This 
does not mean that the Good vas the first in time neceseari-
17, for this ie another question. However, it does me an 
that the Good is first in importance. 'l'he other forms have 
meaning only in relationship to the Form ot the Good. 
The Good is the source and original ground ot all 
existence and gives meaning to all existence without which 
knowledge would be i~possible. The Good mar be compared to 
the Sun as Socrates revealed in the Republic when pressed 
by Glaucon to give a definition ot the Good. 
This, then ., which gives to the obJects of knowledge 
their truth and to him who knows them hie power ot 
knowing, is the Form or essential nature of the 
Good. It is the cause of knowledge and truth; and 
so while you mar think of it as an object ot know-
ledge, you will do well to regard it ae something 
beyond truth and knowledge and, precious ae these 
both are, ot still higher worth. And, Just as in 
our analogy light and vision were to be thought ot 
as like . the Sun, but not identical with it, so here 
both knowledge and truth are to be regarded as. 11ke 
the Good, but to identitr either with the Good is 
wrong. 1 The Good must hold a yet higher place of honor. 
· The Form of the Good is of such a complex nature 
that it is difficult to assign any distinct characteristics 
to it, tor in the Good all opposites are merged into one and 
all contradiction& fade away. 1~e Good becomea the one which 
is eternal, complete, aelr .... eutficient, perr.ect, ideal. It 
goes 'beyond virtue, yet the virtues gain meaning in its 
light. It transcends the eternal values of Truth, Goodness, 
Beauty, Wisdom; yet they are oharaoterist1c of its innermost 
nature; The Good is beyond the reach of knowledge; 2 however, 
training of the 1ntelleot is a preliminary conditioning, 
before the Good is glimpsed by intuition in a mystical-like 
fashion. 
The metaphysical ooneept1on or the Good 1n Plato's 
thought 1s all too 1nolulive. !he vastness or it results in 
the l :o·s§ of diatinguiahing charo.cteristioa. The mind cannot 
succeed in comprehending such greatness, and the concept 
elides past the intellect to be grasped by the powers or in-
tuition alone. For the Good is other than truth and know-
3 ledge. It 1s at the top ot' the Ladder of Truth, Inowledge, 
Beauty and is reached in a flash which is sudden and abrupt~ 
not slow and delibera te.!J. Knowledge of the Good becomes au-
1. ~ 508. ' 
2. ~. 211&. 
3 .. ~. 508e. 
4 ~. 2108. 
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per-rational; ~hat 11, it 1a non-conceptual and non-referen-
t1al. \ It can be understood only in relation to its place in\ 
the system. But the nature of the Good is not a pa~t of any 
eystem of coordinates and cannot be defined or interpreted br '~ 
,\ 
'i.:· 
its place in the system. The Good, in other words. 1e the ' 
sun which is the source and renders visibility to all things. 
\ 
It is the criterion bJ which rational beliefs are tested 1 t .he 
principle or 1ntell1gib111ty. But the criteria cannot be 
tested and must declare themselves. 1 lnovledge of the Good 
transcends truth. Here Plato indicates t hat t he Good 1e not 
a truth; but truth 1a like the Good, but no.t the Good. The ·· 
Good is beyond truth as it is beyond the other virtues. 
This elaboration or the Idea or the Good only goee 
further to illustrate the paradoxical nature of Plato's doc-
trine of the Good, which transcends knowledge, truth, Rnd 
goodnessi yet is eminent in them. 
Mystical a s this interpretation of the Good ma.y seem, 
there 1s an interplay between rea son and insight in gaining 
knowledge or its nature. For ins t ance , tr.om observation of 
beauty in empirical things, one is led to beauty in the forma. 
From here one can contemplate Beauty itself. As indicated, 
there is a progression from reason to insight. For the Idea 
or the Good is attained a.t the extreme limit or the 1ntell1~ 
gible , and by a procesa of defin1tion. 2 The realm ot the 
1. 
2. 
Demos, POP,. 
Rep., 532b; 
' \ . . 
' ... 
I • , 
·~ 
r: 
"·. 't. 
\\ ., 
l. '· !' • 
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intelligible does not contain the Good, rather it suggests 
it. For the vision of the Good is atta ined by a leap--sudden 
and immediate. 
Man can know the Good as it is in its pure state. 
But such an experience is r are and fleeting. For as long as 
he remains in the body and is partially controlled by the de-
sires of the body, knowledge of the Good is impossible for 
him. Such a man is condemned to the cave, and his happiness 
consists ·chiefly in remembrance a nd anticipation. But the 
privileged souls who are . ble to see the Good achieve the 
vision in a state Plato calls madness. There is a question 
whether they reach this state by their own efforts alone or 
not. It is clear that wan must strive and ascend the var. 
ious steps in the ladder or knowledge; at a certa in point 
he becomes passive, and then revelation may or ma:r not 
come. The vision of the Good entails the passivity and the 
aotivitr of man. Once he has viewed the Good, he attempts 
to convert the insight into a system of concepts. This is 
what Plato did when outlining his theory or valuea. 
Plato's system of values it isolated from his con-
cept of the Good would be consistent and understandable. 
But he attempted to merge the two, and confusion resulted. 
Goodness became inherent in things and ret it transcended 
them. Thil haziness loomed largest at the point where 
· being and value merged to become one. What happened was 
that the metaphysical concept of the Good as an eternal, 
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perfec t entity, which was the ground or all, became confused 
with the good ae being good for or instrumental. 
Good as Moral Value 
The Good as moral value is the reason for all things 
being ae they a r e; it is the standard and purpose which gives 
meaning to the universe and prevents purposeless activity. 
The Good is of a two fold nature. Metaphyeioelly, it is the 
really real; and morally, it is the lees really real in a 
descending order. 1 The Good as the reall1 real is made more 
vivid and outstanding when compared 1:rith the· Good which is 
lese real because or its difference; perfection gains by 1m-
perfeot1on.2 
Demos goes eo far as to sugges t that this is the 
first s tatement of the Doctrine of the Gre t t Chain of Being.3 
Considering such an interpreta tion, the cosmos becomes a 
hierarchy of higher and lower forms, a hierarchy of forma 
and things, a hierarchy of higher and lowe r things. The 
Grea t Chain of Being links the eternal pattern with the eter-
4 
nal receptacle. 
This conception of the Good as imminent in the world 
is logically consistent. As Plato says in the Ph1lebue, a 
rational account must not Jump at once but should proceed 
1. Demos, POP, 55 . 
2 . Tim. , 4lb. 
~. Dimes, POP, 56. Ii.. Demos borrowed such an interpre t a tion from Professor Arthur 
Lovejoy, who wrote a book titled ~Great Chain 2£ Being. 
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step b y step, going t hrough all the intervening ste~ee. 1 
This l a of continuity forms t he ba sis of all the l adders in · 
Pla to's philosophy. It renders all empirical goods r a tional. 
Herein lies one of the distinguishing cha.re.cteristios 
of the goodness in the empirical world and the Idea of the 
Good. Things become good because they fit into a log ical 
pattern. Their usefulness and practica.li ty can b e deduced ··""' 
from their very being. Their va lue is enhanced by their re- ' 
l a tion to other things and their usef ulness. As Pla to so 
clearly pointed out; "The best de f inition is and ever will 
be: the useful i s g ood, the harmful is base. 112 The useful-
ness and practicality or any particular, however, depends 
upon its rela tion to the Good. 
Human beings are no exception. They too h~ve a pla ce 
in this hierarchy of values, and their very well being or 
happlnese d.epende upon their fulfillment of the function as-
signed. Each particuler becomes real in so f ar as it pe,rti-
eipatee in the Good. For instance, the man :VhO pe,inte but 
i s a bad painter can not be called a painter in the Platonic 
senae. To be a painter, he mus t work until he has become the 
best possible painter th...,_ t he can. The good for the ind ivi-
dual, as for each particular, must fit into t he universal 
e.cheme of goods . For every element of posl ti ve knowledge 
1. Tim., 16t. 
2. Lodge , PTE, 141. 
must be includ.ed .1 thin the sys tem of values .1 
From an ethieal and. soc11ll point of view, the Good is 
the ideal of eoolal organization which calls out the complete 
development of every member, ea. oh contributing its all to the 
common good. All the so-ca lled goods such as beau~l riches, 
health, influentia l relations are detr iment 1 r ather than 
helpful if their influence is not good. By themselves they 
are neither good nor bad , but their goodness or badness is 
de termined by their r . . tional or irrational uae. This leads 
to a complete relativism i f one does not vie ~ the en t ire lad-
der of values. The completeness of the whole attracted to 
the myetioal Good S.t:lvee ethical standards from becoming me an-
ingles s . 
Socially, e~ch person has a part to play in the com-
munity. How well he . cts h1a role will determine h1s degree 
of happiness. (Pl a to assumes t ha. t the Just man is the happy 
man. A disouseion or this ·rill be presented under the sub-
section entitled "Justice.•) The individual is obliga ted to 
seek the Good a t all times. Because he is a citizen, he is 
obliged to fulfill certain functions and obey the laws in re-
turn for the security of.feTed· by the s t a te. Becaus e he is a 
soul in a body, he is obliged to the highest good to allow 
hie reason to control the rest of his being. The Good cannot 
be seen by a man ~,,ho ie not a t peace t..ri t h himself 
1. Lodge, PTE, 141. 
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and his community. Man must realize that his good lies not 
in the so-called goods or this world but in the use or all 
th t he has. As Socr tea said ne r t he end or the Phaedrus: 
"May I have such a quality or gold as only the wise can 
bear. "1 
The social and ethical conceptions of the Good lead 
to a discussion of the relation or the Good to the use ful or 
the practical in the lite of man. · Plato believed, as the 
Greek dramatists before him, that the order about him indi-
cated that one's life should also be orderly and useful if he 
anted to be at one with the univerae. As Plato said , "He is 
a vain fellow who regards anything but the bad as rid iculous 
. and who in his efforts to atta in the beautiful acts as 
his goal is something other than the Good. 112 Even in a so-
cial interpretation or the Good it is seen that the i dea or 
completeness is important. It is a system or consistency and 
order resulting from a mixture Of forme. In the Timaeus, it 
" " ' is suggested roo be perfect, s Socrates said the Good is,3 is 
to "4 be complex. It is to be "one in manJ. 14 
That every mixture, wh tever it be and rhatever its 
quantity, if it does not me et with measure and a 
symmetrical nature, does of necessity destroy both 
the ingredients and itsel.r, for there exists not a 
tempering, but a certain unmixed bringing together, 
contused truly of this kind on e~ery occasion in 
duality to those who possess it. 
1. Phaedr., 370. 
2 • Jep
1
_. , 452d . 
3.· hi . , blb . 
4 Tim.,4le. 
5· Phrr. ' 155. 
The notion of measure and symmetry suggest harmony which re-
sults from mathematical laws. In the Gorgi as, Plato speaks 
of that orderliness by which heaven and e rth, gods and men, 
are held together and describes it as geometrical equality. 1 
These geometrical conceptions and mathematical ratios are ap-
pearances of the Good. The Good is more than measure and 
symmetry, but measure and symmetry are ratios of the Good in 
so far as the Good can be gr asped by reason. Symmetry sug-
gests the relation of the Good to the Beautiful also. Beauty 
is somehow mysteriously and inseparably connected with the 
Good. It is like an outer shell in which truth and the Good 
are enclosed and which reveals them to re~son. 2 
Therefore, the Good is of a two fold nature: meta-
physically, it is really real, and morally, it is a consis-
tent system of values mysteriously ~onneoted with the Form of 
the Good. From a metaphysical basis, the Idea of the Good is 
the first Form; 1t is a combination or being and value; it is 
the ground Of all things--eternal, self-sufficient, complete, 
perfect. The Good is imminent in the orld as a system ot 
values. In this connection empirical things become good only 
in so t ar as they are able to climb the ladders of value. 
The chief feature of the empirical good is its consistency. 
(1) Logically, the Good is the principle of completeness 
which promotes harmony in the universe. (2) Ethically, the 
1. Gorg. , 50Sa. 
2 • f!!.:... Hip . 
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Good is the standard or norm for all values. It is the end 
as well as the cause. (3) Socially, the Idea of the Good is 
the ideal of social organization which makes it possible for 
each individual to co.nt r ibute his all for the common good. 
There are really two doctrines or the Good. The 
first is a doctrine of the Good as a meta physical entity. 
The second is a doctrine of the Good a s goodness and good for 
in the scale of values inherent in the empirical world. All 
the characteristics previously named such as desirability, 
completion, and selt'-sutticiency are not .the Good itself. 
The importance of this concept lies in its close rela.tion to 
man and the good lite. The questions which tollow are: How 
is man related to the Good? What i s the high est Good for 
him? 
The Virtues 
The good life, as the Good itself, involves the tem-
perate and the orderly, the courageous and the brave, the 
rational and the just. A lite containing the se virtues in 
proper proportions •cannot be other than perfectly good. "l 
The virtues are essentie.l to the development of the ideally 
highest life and the good life cannot be discovered apart 
from them. 
There are four virtues which are consider·ed cardinal 
in Pla tonic thought. They are temperance, courage, reason, 
l • Gorg . , 507 · 
. .-----
and justice. There is e. tendency in Plato to Consoli! .t e 
all the separa te vir tues i nto one exclusive virtue and m ke 
tha t in some 1-vay dependent upon knowledge. This tendency be-
comes articula te in Socra tes' question to Protagoraa . 
Vow I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is 
one whole, of which justice and temperence and holi-
ness are parts; or whether all t~ se are only the 
names of one and the same thing. 
or course, Protagoras being the good skeptic that he was re-
plied that the virtues were distinct and continued to say, 
in essence, 
Poor virtue~ she's but words,--a vain roma~ce 
I took for truth; a slave of circumst ance. 
Socrates denies t his s t outly and prvceeda to prove 
that each virtue is only an aspect of :~. mas ter virtue, . hich 
has its ground in knowled.ge. He uses the example of the vir-
tue courage to substantiate hie position. Protagoras said 
that courage was the inclination to approach the f rightful, 
but he forgot that there are kinds of fri ght ful things; the 
wise man fear s dishonor, and the coward f ears death. Know-
ledge de termines the estimate of the s itua tion, and courage 
is t he "knowledge of which is and is not dangerous."3 Socra-
tes pus es t he point that the virtues depend on knowledge, 
further in the Gorgias when convers ing ;..rith Oe.llicles. 
The virtue of e~ch thing, whether of body or soul, 
instrument or creature, when given to them in the 
1. Prota~., 329. 
2. Calle to at tention by Baker, DM, 2g (The Oxford Book of. 
Greek Verse in Translation, 464.). 
3. Protag., 360. 
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best w~y, comes to them not by choice, but as the re-
sult ot the order and truth and art which are impart-
ed to t em. Am I not right? I mainta in that I am, 
and does not the virtue of eich thing depend on order 
or arrangement? Yes, I say. 
This "order, truth, art" and "order or arrangement" 
depend upon reason, a s will be seen, a nd may be submerged in 
knowledge, for ~knogledge is virtue." To broaden the concept 
of knowledge e.e virtue Plato introduces the concept of jus-
tice. Justice is the almost impossible virtue to attain, tor 
all other virtues are necessary for 1ts development. Al-
though all the virtues are ultimately one, for the eake of 
articulation each virtue will be d1acusaed separately, with 
their unity in the life of the just soul always 1n mind. 
~\fherever anything ia bought ·with or sold for it, 
there in truth will be virtue, courage, temperance, 
Justice; in tact. there every virtue will be pre-
sent, and it matters little whether pleasure or 
care or anything else of this nature is present or 
absent. But whenever such values are severed from 
' f1edom and are then exchanged, there only a shadow 
ot virtue exi.ste which in reality is unworthy of a 
fre e man which contains nothing true nor healthy. 
In truth, temperance, Justice, and oourage consists 
in the purgation from the Ae s ense stimuli, and wis-
dom itself ie a purgation.2 
To give further evidence of the unity or the virtues in Pla-
tonic thought, each or the four main virtues will be dis-
cussed separa tely and summarized in the d1scuas1on or •Jus-
tice." 
Temperance.--The elevation of temperance As one ot 
1. Gorg., 506. 
2. Gorg. 
• 
t he t ou ... card ina l vir tue s i n Pla t onic thoug t is t he res ult 
of the philos opher ' a h.er 1 t ge . Over the D ,l phi i n G.r-eece 
there 1s a motto Jhich expr ess es t his i dea very cl early: 
"Nothing too much," and "Know t hyselt."1 The Greek dr a ma-
ti s ts and poets praised the virtue or the mean, and t he works 
of the a rti s ts r ema in to verify their res tra int. 
The Platonic conception of temperance transcends 
this more popular notion, ho rev er. Temperance to the average 
man means a cer t a in innat e d i sposition to 1ard quie tness, or-
derliness , obedi ence t o laws, and minding one' s own buei-
nese.2 Pla to would say that each definition could be used 
t o promotFJ a good, but in . order to be a good , t he vir tue 
mus t be worth having f or itself a lone. Temperance dwells on 
t •vo levels or value. It i s 1ns trumen t ul in that this dispos-
ition promote s acceptance, obedienc e , docility, and coopera-
tion ' i t h directions of sup~r1or insight. The se a ttributes 
have no value i n themselves; but if rationally used , they can 
bring about values. 'l'he 1ndi v1<1. ua.l s who dwell o r1 thi~ lower 
plane of passivity have a feeling tha t they are living accord. 
1ng t o the good, but they do not really know. 
. . . their happiness depends upon their salt-con-
trol; 1:f the be~ter elements of' the mind which ~ead 
to order and philosophy prevail, then they paea 
their life in this world in happiness and harmony 
. . . masters of themselves and orderly.3 
1. Ritter, EPP, 306. 
2. Oharm. 4 159b; 160e; 16lb; 163a. 3. l:i:en. , 3lc. 
The temperate life consis ts in the enjoyment ot gentle. mild 
pleasures an.d of desires without frenzy. Violent and mad-
dening pleasures could never be a part or the ideal life be-
cause only intemperance could ensue. Plato sometimes spoke 
of taming the passion& and at other times or eliminating 
them. Either way, it may be concluded that the passions are 
no source or strength; yet, they may become causes or inspir-
ation if they are properly oared for and trained. 
The higher level of temperance 1s the level at which 
insight involves the duty of imposing upon oneself the bur-
dens of leadership; at this level one has gained knowledge or 
himself. He knot~a hie capacities as well ·as his limitations. 
The temperate man realizes that he must know the Good in or-
der to be. truly temperate. 1 One may well say that on the 
lower level temperance ha s not been attained, or that the do-
cile man possesses only a degree of temperance. The indivi-
dual at the higher level realizes that acceptance can be a 
vice as well as a virtue. He is a man with duties and res-
ponsibilities that must be cared for. He is temperate be-
cause he recognizes the Good and tries to live. accordingly. 
This is the place where temperance seems to blend with the 
other virtues and become one. Oourage is needed to oarry out 
'lk certain convictions that have been de termined by reason in 
accord with temperance. Here philosophical insight is needed, 
1. Ohara .• 163d. 
because it is only a t this level that man can be truly and 
completely temperate. 1 
There is something about temperance which makes it a 
good, and aooording to the Greek feeling ~~kes tor happiness 
and a higher life; there is an innate d1spo~it1on in man 
which desires moderation. Man reels more attuned to the laws 
of the universe when he lives a self-controlled life. Be-
cause or this disposition he can more easily ~c~ept higher ed-
ucation. Temperance is .rood because it has a natural kinship 
with reason, and because of its willingness to accept what 
reason brings. As Pla to said, 
. . . whereas the simple and moderate desires, which 
with the aid of reason and right belief are guided by 
reflection, you will find only in a tew, and those 
with the best inborn dispositions and the best edu-
cated.2 
In summary, temperance is a good to be desired. tor itself, 
but it too is subject to reason. There is a tendency in the 
temperate man to follow an opinion which is right on the ba-
sis of its value which 1s determined by reason. There is 
also present a sense of values in temperance, whether it is 
at the lower level guided by right opinion or at the higher 
level guided by reason and philosophical insight. The tem-
perate life, therefore, is a good life because it embodies a 
e · mixture of natures which are blended into one. All men can 
be temperate on one level or the other and can devote them-
1. Phaed., 6Sc-d. 
2. Rep., 43lo. 
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selves to the control or instincts by reason. 
Oourage.--The virtue which is characteristic or the 
guardian class 1n Plato's ideal society is courage. Courage 
is an innate psychophysical disposition whi.ch manifests it-
self physiologically in accelerated heartbeat, more rapid 
breathing, and blood flow. This disposition can be developed 
by certain hardening processes used in physical educa tion 
programs. The ehell-like protectiv9ness produ~e~ andre-
vealed in the t ace of danger was what the Greeks meant by 
. coure.ge. 
The question as to the nature or courage was asked 
Socrates by Laches, who defined courage as endurance in bat-
tle, and he wanted to know 1f courage would measure up to a 
virtue according to the standard of the Good. Socrates 
pointed out that all endurances are not good. For example, 
an individual can endur•e much sufferi ng tor an unjust cause, 
or one may ·s\lfrer more hardahipa tha.n the end justifies. In 
either case, courage could not be Gcnsidered a good because 
its consequences were not desirable or Just. Instead. Socra-
tes replied that courag e ie a positive, desirable virtue. It 
consists in a knowledge or what is to be teared and what is 
not to be feared. The only knowledge that provides this in-
formation for man is knowledge of the Good. That which 1e 
good should not be reared, but thAt 7h1ch is not of the Good 
should. From this it can be seen that the courageous man 1e 
temperate; he di.tfers t'rom the coward in that he shows no 
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tear and t'rom the "dare-devil" in that he shows no daring in-
trepidity. He realizes that tear comes from ignorance of 
what is good and what is evil. (Socrates' behavior at h1a 
trial is illustrative of the action and attitude of a coura-
geous man. He was certain that no evil could befall a good 
man and accepted his unJust conviction as a duty to be ob-
served.) 
In summary, courage, as temperance, depends upon 
knowledge. Knowledge of what i s to be feared and what 1e not 
to be teared. It is the willingness to act in accord with 
rational insight regardless of temptation ~hether it be 
pleasure, pain, fear, or desire. Courage in abstraction is 
natural to man; b\lt tor consistency in practice, discipline 
by intellect 1s necessarr. 1 Courage 1n its absolute s.ense, 
as temperance, becomes indistinguishable from the other vir-
tues and merged within the all-embracing virtue, Justice. 
Rea'son.--
. it. will be the busines s of reas.on to rule with 
wiadom and forethought on behalf of the entire soul; 
while the spirited element ought to act a s its sub-
ordinate and ally.2 
The dutr or reason is to rule; or the nature or rea-
eon there can be no certainty. Plato describes her in a 
poetic fashion. He likens reason to the charioteer in the 
myth which appears in the Phaedrus. Because of his knowledge 
1. Gorg. • 49l'b. 
2. ReJ2. ,' 44la-b. 
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of the Good, which i s pi~ tured a s the sun. the chariotee.r 
d.ireote hie vehicle in her d.irect1on. But the bright re.ys ot 
the sun could. not be borne 1.o~ithout ad justing hie eyes to the 
grol,r!.ng brightness and. the pain from the light. To suc oeeC'_ 
at this he would poeeees eelf-con.tr.ol, pereeverance, determi-
nation, and courage. No man can become master of himself if 
he lacks the harmony and self-control which come from disci-
pline of the mind. If he cannot control himself, then he can 
not achieve knowledge of the Good. Only after he has linked 
all elements within h1meelt together will he become one in-
etea.d of many; only after he is harmoniously attuned will he 
be able to master himself. Reason is the promoter of or der 
and agreement. As suoh 1 t is an essential virtue ~.,1 thout 
which the Good itself could not be known . . There is a progres-
sion from reason to insight wh1oh enables a bodied soul to 
glimpse that which 1t desires --the Idea. ·of . the Good. 
Justioe.--Reason, courage, temper ance--all three are 
united in the all-embracing virtue, jus t1oe . The Republic 
i teelr ma;r be said to be a leng thy d,ef1ni t1on or justice. It 
1e seen that Plato d.ef1nes justice in the state in order to 
illuatra te and make more meaningful. it seems, hie expl ana-
tion or the Jus t soul. Justice in the sta te means that the 
three social runotions--governing , execut i ve, and productive--
are kept distinct yet rightly per formed. But t he ind1v1dua,l , 
he says. is the •state writ large." Therefore the three ele-
ments irJ the state correspond to the elements o f the soul, 
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which are appetite, Spirit, and reason. All three factors 
are present 1n all souls, and society is so divided because 
these elements are developed to various degrees 1n di f ferent 
individuals . 
. 
Before a soul can be just, there are certain demands 
to be met. A definite condition of the soul must be achieved 
1n which reason rules and directs the will. Justice, itself, 
is the point whe:ce all the cardinal virtues--temperance, 
courage, and reason--meet. It consists in having reason take 
over the rule and the care ot the entire soul and with the 
aid of courage keep the senses und appe tites in check. 1 The 
Just soul, because of its harmony, is happy . 
This statement bas been challenged, and tor this rea-
son three argwnents are advanced in the Republic to substan-
tiate the tact that the Just man is happier than the unjust 
man. The first argument begins that the man whose soul is 
under the despotism or a master passion is the unhappiest. 
He is unhappy because he lacks freedom, is controlled b y 
wealth, and tears insecurity. Such a man is laboring under 
meaningless servitude because he cannot control his ambition 
and desires. The best elements within him are enslaved 
while the intempera te; corrupt parts control his being. This 
man, as the despotic state, is degraded to shamef ulness be-
cause ot the many wants that cannot be satisfied. He is 
1. ~~ 50!t. 
... 
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.urged on by detrimental desires to aeek aecuri ty 1n fleeting 
valueR, such as ~,,ealth and power, and becomes the most mis-
erable ot men. The wealth he has gained cannot buy for him 
the love and friendship that he and every soul longs for. 
In tact because ot h1e money he leads a lonely and miserable 
lite away from the herd. He 1s suspicious and mistrustful 
ot everyone. Eventually such tears turn .h1m into a parasite 
depending on his henchmen tor protection. He becomes a tool -
in their hands and suffers more with his newly acquired 
wealth than ever before. What ever people may th1 nlc, the 
actual tyrant (unjust man) is really the most abJect sl.ave, 
a parasite ot ' the vilest scoundrels. Never able to satisfy 
his desires, he is al~ays in need; and, to an eye that sees 
a soul in its entirety,. he will seem to be the 1 pooreat ot 
the poor. •1 
It is evident from the first argument that the soul 
. ruled by a master passion is unhappy in comparison with the 
soul or the Just man which is well-rounded and guided by 
reason. "··· the happiest man is he who 1a first in goodness 
and justice, namely, the true king who is also king over 
h1mselt.• 2 
The second argument: Because each part or the sou1 
has its own form ot pleasure and its peculiar desire, 1t 
seems that any one ot the three could govern the soul. 
1 • Rep • , 519 • 
2 • . Rep., S78d. 
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There is the part with which man gai ns knowledge and under-
standing, another which may be called honor-loving or ambi-
tious, and another which is eo multifarious that no single 
name will be appropriate but could be named after its most 
domi nate oharao.teristic, appetite. The third element could 
be referred to as •money-loving• also, becaus e this 1a the 
chief concern ot the appetite. The human soul, it is ar-
gued, is sometimes governed by one principle and sometimes 
by another. Individuals guide or are guided by one of the 
three. Since this is true, there are three corresponding 
types or individuals; and, the argument continues, it a man 
representing each type were asked which life was the plea-
santest, each man would praise hie own above all others ~ 
The business man would say that the art ot profit making is 
more pleasant than dreaming or a reputation it it brought in 
more money. The spirited man would shun pleasure derived 
fro m making money a s beneath him and the pleasure of learn-
ing tor its sake alone as a waste ot time. His reputation 
would be all important to him. The philosopher would think 
that knowing the truth and always gaining a fresher under-
standing are beyond all comparison with other pleasures. 
Who oould say which man 1s right and wh1oh is wrong? Each 
man is bt:.s ing his knowledge on his experience. 
Plato realized the ditfioulty or answering this 
question, whioh was the question or the day. Is man the 
measure of all things as the Sophists said? Basing hie 
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ana~er on the :foundation of experience, insight1 and reason-
ing, he said that the philosopher wa.s t.h.e beat Judge because 
he alone would have experienced the peo~liar pleasures of 
all three parts o:f the soul, and whose experience is sup-
por~ed by reason and insight. (The training of the philo-
sopher which makes this statement valid will be discussed in 
the next seetion.) Plato agrees that the pleasure of honor 
comes to all men-~he rich, the brave, and the vise--but 
only the philosopher can know how sweet it is to contemplate 
the truth. The philosopher because or his training would be 
better prepared to reach a decision through reason: there-
fore, t he man who uses reason tor the pursui.t of wisdom 
would be the person to judge what waa most valuable. "or 
the t hree kinds of pleasure, then, the sweetest will belong 
to that part or the soul whereby we gain understanding and 
knowledge, and the man in whom that part predominates will 
have the pleasantest lite." 1 
The Just man is deemed to be happier than the un-
just one in two arguments, but a third argument is advanced 
1n favor of the unjust man's happiness. The third proof ot 
the just man's happiness turns on the distinction between 
pure or positive pleasure, and illusory pleasures wh1oll are 
exaggerated by the comparison with a preceding want or pain. 
Pleaeure, it was said, is a neutral state between intense 
l. Rep., 582d. 
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pain a. Xt iS' ,a oompa.rat1 ve state recognized by man and 1a 
not the height of ---.o si t1 ve enJoyment but 11 the peace which 
comes' wi th the absence ot pa1n. 111 It this is true, then it 
i s the state ot rest wh1oh is pleasant because it lies be-
t, een .:that ~h-i.o~ 1s painful and lees painful. The argument 
r.ras decl.ared invalid by Socrates. He said t hat people who 
·think of pleasure aa being something oompara.tive instead or 
positive are deceived in tbelr ignorance bf the contrast be-
t ween pain and the absenoe .ot pain, just as one who has 
never seen white is deceived by the contrast between black 
and gray. One must have knowledge of truth and reality be-
fore any sound ideas or what is pleasantest can be advanced. 
One must rise above the level ~t comparative pleasures in 
order not to fail to distinguish between the higher and low-
er pleasures. The question which is then asked by Socrates 
is which is more pleasant. that which is connected with the 
contingent or that which is connected with the eternal. 
This is the same question that he asked Ion in the dialogue 
named for the latter. Can the knowledge ot a particular 
give us Truth? These questions are et111 important tor us 
today. Socrates attempted an answer when he said, 
Those who have no experience ot wisdom and virtue 
and spend their whole time 1n feasting and selt-1n-
dulgelce are all their lives fluctuating downwards 
trom the central point and baok again, but never 
rise beyond 1 t into the ·iirue upper region, to which 
1. ~. S8Jb. 
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they have no·t lifted their eyes. Never real ly sat-
isried vi th real no.urishment, the pleasure they 
· t~s te is uncer ~ain and impure. Bent over their ta-
bles, they reed like cattle with stoo~1ng heads and 
eyea fixed upon the ground; so they grow tat and 
breed, and in their struggle kick and butt one 
another to death ·with horns and hoofs of steel, be-
cause they can never satiety with unreal nourish-
men .at part ot themselves which is ttselt unreal 
and incapable or lasting satistaction. 
Will the unjust man be happy if his dark deeds are 
not discovered? No, answered Socrates. It he does escape 
detection and punishment, he will be protitless because he 
will probably grow worse. It he had been round out, it is 
possible that the brute within him could have been tamed and 
his soul could have been restored to its native soundness. 
Such a man would still love to 1 live with himselt• and race 
his shortcomings. As Socrates said, justice is good, not 
· because it is the best policy in the long run, but because 
it is the ultimate principle upon which the universe is 
constructed. 2 1 But in reality justice ••• is not a mat-
ter or internal behavior, but or the inward selt and or at-
taining to all that is in the fullest sense a man's proper 
conoern.•J Ho, an escapee has not escaped the universal law 
ot justice which acts internally as well as ext•rnally upon 
the individual. 
The question now arises, why is there evil in man it 
he is happier and will prot1t more it he is good. Why 
1. ~. J86a-c. 
2. Rep,, 444b. 
3. Rep. 1 44Jb. 
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should the soul be ignorant and we~ it man is essentially 
good? The answer to this question is tourtold--1gnorance, 
internal strife, social order, and the past: or, it modern 
terms were used, one could say that the sources ot evil 
were the misuse of free w111 and conditioning toroes ot 
heredity and environment_. The root evil is sometimes called 
ignorance by Plato. Igno·rance, however, is not a negative 
quality but the presence or a I Ei.lse bel18f which 1s thought 
to be true; and out ot this self-deception grows all other 
ev1le. 1 In other dialogues the root evil is spoken or as 
internal strife or dissension instead ot as evil. Eternal 
str1'fe is considered the greateiJt evil because the unity or 
the soul is broken. 2 Evil is represented here as a revolu-
tion of the part against the whole, as in the case or the 
despotic man who allowed his appetite, which fluctuated con-
tinuously, to control the higher part or his soul. When an 
artificial order is established with the appetite as the 
leader, the harmony or universal, ·social, and individual 
values has been lost. 
The individual, however, is not the cause or all 
evil. He inherits a good part of it from those who were be-
t'ore him. 
My good man, the evil toroe that now moves you and 
prompts you to go temple robbing is neither or hu-
man origin nor ot divine but it is some impulse 
1 • l!.!l2.t... 44 s c • 
2. ~oph., 228; Tim,, 86. 
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bred or old in men from ancient wrongs unexpiated 
which courses round wreaking ruin.l 
Such evil as this results from the past and cannot be 
changed by man. It is the lure or the receptacle appearing 
again causing men to reJect what is good. 
There are evils resulting tr-am the social ord&r in 
which man finds himself .. Plato o~red the individual with 
the state; acooreing to th1s ane.log7 evil in the individual 
1s the reflection ot evil 1n the oommunitr. Plato said that 
society and not the individual should be blamed tor the 
wickedness which existed; the blaae should rest with the 
1 begetter, not ••• the begotten.•2 Plato also makes a 
point that both virtue and vice must arise trom a strong 
soul because a weak soul is incapable or anything great. 
Vice, as illustrated in the case of the tyrant, arises from 
the perversion ot a great gitt. 1 The more vigorous a seed 
is, the more it falls short or its proper perfection when 
deprived ot the season, the rood, the place that suits it. 
For evil is more opposed to the good than to the not-good.•J 
However, to assign evil to the past or to the exist-
ing eooial order does not give a relevant account or evil .. 
Since evil is not a negative quality but a positive one, it 
must have a definite root. To go backwards, evil in the 
soul is due to ignorance or internal strife; internal strife 
1. Laws, 8.54b. 
2. Aim,, 87b. 
J. £Wt,., 49lb, 
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ie due to the exi.sting eoo1al ordsr; the existing social 
order i s due to the past which in turn is due to the crea-
tor. The only answer to be ventured is that evil 1s an un-
preventable part or the divine plan without which creation 
could not have taken place. 
Can the fallen soul beoome good again? The best 
account or the fallen soul is the myth of the cave. The 
individuals in the cave live i n a world of illusion i n 
which they are ignorant or themselves and of the world. 
\ihen they .look about them they can see only the reflections 
ot objects which were retlect1ona themselv'es. The first act 
is a revolutionary one in which the chaine of man are bro-
ken. He is then tree to turn his entire body and face the 
source or light. This is painful at first; and as be flnds 
the source ot light and sees objects as they are. it will be 
unbelievable. The weak man will not race the change, but 
will return to the false security he had previously knowo. 
' 
The courageous man will continue the upward path, leaving 
the cave behi nd him. Outside there would be a steep. rugged 
hill which is to represent the arduous, painful task of edu-
ca tion. The light fro m the sun, whioh 1s the true light, 
would blind the tree man 'because he would bave been used to 
walking in shadows produced by darkness. All at once every-
thing would become clear to him. He would see men as they 
are, objects as valueless, .and the Sun as the True Light. 
The .most important point or the myth is not the break1n~ or 
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the chaine, difficult asoen\. to knowledge, nor 11a1on of the 
good; it i s the emphasis placed on the descent into the cave 
again and again. 
The return to the cave is more painful than the e s-
cape. The enlightened man loses his way in the darkness; 
he 1s laughed at by fool!!, and criticized by friends. If he 
is too weak to bear their rebuttals or not patient enough to 
instruct, he will return to the outer world to contemplat e 
on t he Form of the Good. This would be a monastic lite that 
could not be as rich a s the lite of the character who con-
tinuously moves between the outer world and the oave. The 
weaker philosopher's lite would lack the mixture wh1oh makes 
tor harmony and enrichment. But the man who returns to the 
cave with hie vision as a shield before him will tear no 
evil. He will know that no harm oan befall a good man and 
will try to lead those who will follow him into the real 
world. 
There is no need tor man to reel that he is weighed 
down by past evils. Onoe again, as 1n the myth or Er, Plato 
is stressing tree choice. Man is morally responsible for 
the kind ot individual he becomes. The highest lite tor man 
can only be lived 1n the ~1ght of freedo m of oho1oe. Man as 
a part of the universe seeks the best possible life tor him-
self as ~ell as the supreme good for all. How 1s man •s an 
individual related to the highest good? What 1e the highest 
good tor man? 
The Highest Good to~ Man 
The summum bonum for man in the p1alogues 1e the 
ideally perfect life. The pattern of the perfect lite is 
outlined in the Philebue as the mixed life of oontem:plation 
o.nd action a.c.cording to the Idea or the Good. This position 
overturns two popular• notions or what is the highest good 
for man. The first po:>ular et&.ndpo i nt appears on two lev-
ela--aocial and individual. The 1nd1v1dual regards all eo-
called goods as being good 1n themselves and be·l1evee that 
the highest good tor the individual consists 1n acquiring 
possessions of these goods. It suoh were true, the rioh 
would be the only ones who were happy. They would be 
thought of as posRessing all that is of value. On the 
social level, the interest would be in the survival or the 
community and 1 ta increase 1n power, weal th• and. law and 
order, It would be concerned with goodness of character, 
genius, religion, research, and philosophy only in so far as 
t hey could be utilized by the community. This U 1l ust:rates a 
disco~d betwe en individual and social goods which makes 1t 
impossible tor the possession ot goods to be the aource ot 
1 eal lite tor man. 
The eo-oalled philosophic standpoint proper ia as 
contradictory to the Platonio view or the highest good for 
man as the popular notion ot the value of acquiring posses-
sions. for the philosopher none or the so-called goods or 
thi s world possess ultimate value. The actual world seems 
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unreal to him; 1t is tluotuat1ng, sensory, chaotic, contused, 
and meaningless. Only the ideal world satisfies all the de-
mands of his reason.. So he retires to his garden and dreams 
ot that whion 1a perteot, beautiful, systematic, permanent, 
clear-out, intelligent, transcendental--though not actual. 
The ideal world represents the m~n between the two 
extremes, as in the Philebug. The wise man realizes that 
the things ot this world are not •goods• but neither are 
they evils. They are here to be used, and their usage de-
termines whether they beoome goods or evils. However, the 
wise man sees good only where it may be realized with the 
means at his disposal; the ideal can become actual only 1n 
so tar as empirical means and motives become illumined with 
transcendental insight and lose their merely empirical char-
acter to become one with the universal structure. 
The highest value for man is not the abaorbtion into 
a contemplative ideal realm as suggested in the fhaedo and 
the Republic. but it is the development ot character through 
i 
participating in virtues as reason directs. In other words, 
the highest good for the individual is living as a conscious• 
ly .organio portion of the whole and by so doing realizing 
his deepest happiness and well-being. 
In the Ph1lebus, it is stated that the summum bonum 
must be uniTereally desirable, complete, entire, and per-
:reotly sufficient. These demands oan be fulfilled only by a 
lite which is tull and aomplete rather than one-sided and 
6; 
abst r act· a 11re whj_ch 1e r ichl y emrl5.r 1cal rathr-:r tha n pure--
ly transcendental . The t'un(tnmental pr1nn1ple in such c-:. l~_fe 
i Q ;nea .ur or t he po-wer of orga n1z.at 1.on. Tl11 Fl life mus t be 
rearranged t o be a. gro~;1 ng , h~rmonious ,. Fiye t emat1 c -,.;hole in 
wh i ch onl y posit ive value s oan ti t . 
A life of value-~ealizat1on beoome 8 more than &n 
idea l only i n the philo s ophel'. Pl ato ha.d before h~. m e. me:l-
tul p ictur e of h ie tee.cher and ir.lol , So cl.:>atea , wh en h e des-
cribed the ph i lo eoph e:r. The l i f e of Soc ~at e.e \·ia..a a l t vine,. 
test i mony of the bea t possible l l !e. To get a clear picture 
of t he ~nilosopher-1\:lng . the dest,:r1r t1o n o f a philosopher by 
Socra te s twd Alc1b1adee w1ll. b e di C~ cueef_Hi .. 
The True Philosopher 
According to Socrates, the philosopher is myetica1 
in a sense. In order to emphasize the sincerity and forth-
rightnes s of the philosopher in contrast with the devious-
ness and deceitfulnes s of this world, he called the 
philosopher other~vorldly. The philosopher ie not totally 
out of this world because he is acquainted with universals ; 
he is at home in both worlds. As illustrated 1n the Qrito. 
Socrates was a law-abiding oit1zen. He refused to break the 
laww, of the city even though he had been unJustly accused 
and condemned. He had made a contract with the city in 
which he had promised to obey its laws in return tor protec-
tion and security. The Sophists accused the philosopher ot 
escaping into a world of abstraction because he oould not 
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tain extent thrtt phi loao-phe:r-a H.l"e H b1t :tm .>'l·<~ctic~l, un-
13k1lled with their hands, inoapa1)1e of. even tying up their 
bed-clothes ln1;o a neA.t bu.ncllr~ . When a hanrlsor11e ft=llmv 1 .~ 
pr>a1sed for his ~vod. look~ , the pr1tlo opher will not be able 
to see the va.lue in the look iOi . ~lhen t1 r1nh m~tn L~ be1ng 
l'ralsed tor hie wealth, h e 'Hill not be ,.ble to see · hy tl1{) 
r1ch rn n ahoulu be prai sed. Bu·· if 1 t 1;3 true tha.t the 
. 
valu~ s of this world are only .i.13trument~l, then the philo-
sopher 1s t he wise one. 
The .-'1cture Alcibiadee paints of the philosophei" in . 
t he Symposium i s h1 ~ view of Soo:r.oH.tes. Althou h Alc1b1a.des 
i s afraid of Socr«tet~ , he is myotel"1oualy d.ra'Ym to hit:'! be-
e .use of hie many powera. ~hifl man, Socrate f3 1 is a mystery 
to me, he A .tty a, and. hie hold. on mf: is a mystery slao. He is 
t he only man who can ma.ke me a shamed, and l ~tah tha.t he 
would go away; yet if he did this, I would be the most m:tA-
erable of men . I have lts tened to me.py te.mous or _ tor E.! , but 
their elo;quent speeches are unoomparable to hi a common 
worde. li ·1y heal"'t 1 .. p s and te&:rs :run out o t' my eye s c.t the 
eo unc1 of his speech; and I see great numbers of other people 
having the same exper1eno~ .• 1 
You would be surprised to find that this divine bit 
of humani ty is also a mc.n ot action. During the camps.1gp.:s 
he endured more ha.;rdahlps than any ot us. In one ot the 
l. Symo ,, 320a. 
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battles when the troopa retreated in disorder, he stepped 
along just as it he were in the streets ot Athens, cQlmly 
looking at friend and toe alike ., and giving eYeryone the 
understanding that he would defend himselt stoutl;y it at-
tacked. Th1e courageous man could beoome so involved in 
some problem that he would stand tor hOurs in quiet contem-
plation until at last he was satisfied. This man 1s beyond 
understanding. He is a mystic, homely mingling with men and 
yet apart from us. 
Alcibiades succeeded in giving the characteristics 
or a true philosopher in his rambling sort ot way. Here was 
a man who because ot the varied content ot his lite led an 
enriched and developt_ng exietenoe. He was temperate, cour-
ageous, and wise. His only intense indulgence was his search 
tor truth. Plato exhibits the conception ot eros in actual 
operation through Alcibiades 1 speech. The earthly and inar-
ticulate love or Alcibiades tor Socrates is interpreted as 
the movement ot !,!:2.!1 the love or the impert'eot ror the 
perrect. 1 
Plato's chief oonoern was how such a man as Socrates 
could be produced. His answer was correct training in 
which new individuals would emerge and change the existing 
social order. · Because all men do not have the same mental 
ability, the wisest should be the ones to guide the less 
wise. In the conception ot the philosopher-king, the state 
l. ~. 212d-22Jd. 
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and the individual became one; the abstract and the actual 
~re together as the soul of the philosopher is unified. Only 
through such a man can llhe wholeness oome about because he 
knows the good tor each thing and the common good tor all. 
The philosopher will po.ssess natural virtues and 
reason, but in order to use them to the best advantage he 
must be subJected to intensive formal training. The program 
tor education may be summarlzed as follows. · Up to the ages 
ot seventeen and eighteen all children would be trained in 
literature, music, and a little elementary mathematics. 
from the ages or eighteen to twenty an intensive course or 
physical and military training will be endured, leaving no 
t1me tor leis~re or study. By the time that the student has 
finished such training, a test will be given 1n order to de-
termine t~e ones that will continue studying. The ones that 
pass will be given advanced training 1n mathematics and· its 
relation to other reality tor ten years. Arter turther se-
lection at this time, t1ve years will be devoted to the study 
ot dialectics and the pr1nc~ple ot morality. Between the 
ages of th1rty-t1ve and fifty, he will gain practical exper-
ience by public service in subordinate poets. At the age or 
fifty the beet will reach the vision of the good and there-
after divide their time between study and governing the 
state. 
Such a program or studies provides tor individual 
differences by allowing periods tor mental and philosophical 
development, theoret1oal and praotloal growth. fhe h1lo-
eopher-ruler will be aubJeoted to lllallJ temptations and testa 
ot endurance before he reaohee the level ot public eerv1oe. 
Hie training ie r1oh, varied, and oonta1na aan1 poae1b111t1es 
tor gro th aa hie lite should. 
The queet1on asked 1e how th1a ideal 1nd1v1dual oan 
oome to be. It ie obvious that under the ex1st1ng aoolal 
order no euob tra1n1ng oould be advanced. Onl7 through a 
revolution i n the atate aB ,auggeeted by Plato oould this pro-
gram be established. Aa Socrates said, the artiat oan paint 
a picture that baa not been seen b7 anyone and 7et the 
beautr ot the picture oannot be denied. Suoh ie the oase ot 
the philosopher. 
Acoord1ng to Plato, the philosopher d1ttere trom 
other men because he ie a lover ot truth. Beoauae he loves 
all truth, he retuaee to be aat1atied with & kind ot know-
ledge wh1oh 1a aoourate onl7 in eo tar as it goea but does 
not oover the ent1retJ. He presses forward until he reaohea 
~he end ot the intellectual world and apDrebende truth in 
1ts own nature. In hie knowledge all the v1rtuee are one 
because the:y are all good. He real1zea the interrelatedness 
ot all things and oombtnea the pleasuree of min4 and ap-
petite to develop a. r1oher, more barmonioua lite. He 1a 
alwaJ& seeking positive values to give himeelt a tr•sber 
view or the whole. 
70 
CHAPTER IV 
MAN AND SOCIETY 
There seems to be an innate impulse toward perfec-
tion in Plato, as in most or the early Greek thinkers. Per-
fection was the aim of the professions as well as of the 
arts. The idea of the "best state" was not new with him by 
any means. Long before his time many Greeks had speculated 
about the ideal social conditions for the improvement of 
man. Many of the old poets had written of an ideal state or 
law and order; the Spartan Tystaeus had proclaimed that the 
perfect order was identical with Spart~n tradition. Solon 
went further and derived the perfect state from the eternal 
ideals of moral reason. Some of the Sophists went still fur-
ther and gave concrete proposals for bettering social condi-
tions. Plato's Regublic was born from a rich and varied 
heritage. His approach to the study of social conditions 
differed from that or his predecessors and contemporaries in 
that he did not content himself with assuming one type of 
constitution and giving "advise" for its improvement, or with 
discussion of the relative va lues of each type of constitu-
tion as did the Sophists. His approach was more radical; he 
begins with the -general problem of justice. 
Plato begins the discussion of the state without 
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menti oning the subject at all. Instead the characters are 
interested in one virtue, justice. Through the discussion 
some valuable information concerning the ori~in of the state 
is imparted. It is a natural, spontaneous production of man 
and not an unnatural social contract as implted by Glaucon! 
nor an organized oppression of the weak as Thasymachus in-
sisted.1 Instead, the state is an organic, hierarchical 
whole which arises from the lack of individual self-suffi-
ciency. Each individual depends on others to supply many of 
his needs. Others in turn are dependent upon him. Because 
this is the basic nature of the state, service for indivi-
duals, the state is to promote the well being and growth of 
its citizens. Its goodness or justice is determined by this 
factor, for the state is good or just only in so far as it 
provides for individual development. The individual and 
society depend upon each other for mutual assistance and sur-
vival. 
Although the relationship between the individual and 
society is a necessary one, it is not necessarily symmetri-
cal. The state supplies · many of the material and efficient 
causes without which individual life would be ' impossible; in 
return the individual contributes formal and final causes 
without which the state would be meaningless. Hence, it seems 
that the state depends on the individual more than he does on 
1. Rep., 365. 
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the state. The crucial difference between social life and 
individual life must be clarified, however, before an ade-
quate theory of man can be developed. 
The state is a composite being made up of many in-
dividuals livi ng in one designated area during a particular 
time. It is, in other words, a whole made up of individuals 
who are parts. This is not the basic differen-ce bet\veen the 
two. The individual is also a composite being made up of 
many parts. As the state is a whole, so is the individual. 
Plato used the knowledge he had of the state to spell out the 
characteristics of the soul in a clearer fashion. The pic-
ture of the state is larger and more distinct. The crucial 
difference between the individual and the state is not evi-
dent here. It l i e s in the fact that only the individual in-
tellect has access to the pure forms and can be inspired by 
them. The state itself is never met. Only some representa-
tive in the form of the governor, or councilman, or such is 
ever seen. As an organism the state cannot think coherently 
or plan. This is the task of individual minds, because hu-
man intellect is the only source of reason and purpose. The 
individual as such cannot exist without the state although it 
is true to say that intellectually the in~ividual is more 
than the state. Social life, which is external and cannot 
represent life in its truest form, depends upon intellect , 
which is symbolized in the life of man. But individual life 
is so intertwined with social life that life without society 
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becomes .impossible. Plato never gives the picture of a 
-"feral" man or some lone wanderer in an idyllic existence as 
portrayed by Rousseau. He realized tha t society ha s definite 
. effects upon the thoughts of man. This .is one reason why he 
detested the artist who was not a philosopher. Such an ar-
tist could make second-hand copies of reality so attractive 
that people considered th~se as being real. The young must 
grow up with beauty about him so he would have beautiful 
thoughts. 1 If one is surrounded by imitations, his life 
will become such. This does not mean that the individual 
should live without society, but tends to illustrate how so-
ciety helps to mold man. The state is important and gains 
its importance because it makes possible ~ a mode of life 
more unified, more clear, more stable, and more sharply arti-
culated than that of its reflected counterpart.n2 
The degree tha t this unification, clarity,. and sta-
bility may become manifested in human existence is determined 
to a large extent by the type of state in which the indivi-
dual lives. If the state is just, then it is so because the 
people who compose it are just. Hence, the first step in the 
. transformation of society is the development of personalities. 
Human character must be molded from early childhood and 
guided continuously. In order to achieve the type of indivi-
dual and state desired, Plato outlines five steps through 
1. Re 12.· , VI. 
2. Wild, PTM, 135. 
which the reformation of the individual and the state is 
possible. 
First, there should be a thoroughly organized edu-
cational program. This can be done through education as 
trea ted by Pla to in the Republic. He considers educati on an 
integral and vital part of the wider subject of the well-be-
ing of individuals. There is need for a thoroughly organized 
educational program which includes all members of the state. 
An analysis of the soul, however, is necessary before a really 
rational theory of education can be advanced . 
The human soul is emphatically and before all else 
"something living, something which in the strict sense we 
can neither create nor destroy, but which we can feed or 
s t arve, nourish or poison."l As a living entity, it must be 
nourished . Nurture is really the essence of true education. 
The nature of the soul determines the type of nourishment it 
needs. However, before these favorable conditions can be 
met, the psychology of the soul must be understood. 
The soul is a complex whole which consists of three 
parts--appetite , spirit, and reason. Beginning at the lower 
end of the scale is appetite. It was so called because it 
corre sponds to the bodily desires; it is also called "the 
wealth-loving or gain-loving element.~ There are two kinds 
of a ppetites which a~e termed necessary and unnecessary by 
Plato. Necessary a ppetites are those which we cannot get rid 
1. Nettleship, TEPR, 5. 
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of and the satisfaction of which proves to be good. Unneces-
sary a p. eti t es are those superfluous ones whose satisfaction 
proves to be harmful. Appetites form the largest portion of 
the soul, and the majority of men live fer them, but Plato 
does not devote his chief share of attention to this aspect 
in the theory of education. The appetites instead are to be 
tamed. By this he means that man should train the appetites 
in order that they may contribute to the good of the whole 
soul. 
The second element in his analysis of the soul is 
not quite so easily described or understood. This is the in-
dispensable foundation of courage, which is common to good 
watch dogs, horses, and such. It is the source of pugnacity 
and aggressiveness, with their possible developments into 
ferocity and cruelty. Spirit is said to be that part of the 
soul which is peculiarly fostered and stimulated by athletic 
exercise; it is the "low" element in human nature which if 
rightly cultured becomes true bravery, but if exclusively en-
couraged degenera tes into blind brutality. 
In Plato' s mind the third element is the highest. 
He refers to it as "the philosophic."! This element is in-
troduced as a necessary psychological complement of the ele-
ment of spirit which would be unbalanced were it not for this 
counterbalancing factor. These three elements are distinct, 
1. ~' 3?6c. 
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but inseparable. They form the inner nature of man, which 
is divine or most divine in man. A review of the psychology 
of the s oul is necessary in order to understantl the proposals 
made by Plato in his theory of education. The function of 
education, as he conceives it, is to provide nourishment for 
the soul. 
The soul is the object of "musica l" a s well as 'kym-
nastic" training. At first sight it would appear that the 
objects of music and gymnastics are opposite; music culti-
vates the inner man, a·nd gymnastics is related to bodily 
training. The truth is that music and gymnastics appeal to 
the development of the soul. Music educates not only the 
character, but the philosophic part of the soul as well. 
While gymnastics produces bodily health and strength, it also 
disciplines the psychological element of spirit. Hence the 
soul is the object of both types of training. 
Musical training begins before gymnastics, for sto-
ries are told to children long before they can take physical 
exercise. Literature, music, and the other fine arts combine 
to form "musical'' education. Employment of these methods 
makes it pos oible to express certain ethical characteristics 
which are conveyed through the eye and ear to the soul. Of 
the various kinds, literature in the form of myths, stories, 
and poetry comes first. The question raised first is what 
should it express and then how should it be expressed. The 
first question is concerned with content and the second with 
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form. Plato was concerned with the presentation, or style, 
and how it i nfluences the mind . Such a problem as the one of 
style did not arise until relatively l a te in the development 
of the child. Hence the concern at the beginning of educa-
tion, during infancy, should be with regard to content or 
substance of literature. 
And the beginning, as you know, is always the most 
important part, especially in dealing with anything 
young and tender. That is the time when the charac-
ter is being molded and easily takes any impress one 
may wish to stamp upon it.l 
This is Plato's reason for giving a great deal of attention 
to the beginning of education. The young soul like t he young 
body is plas~ic and malleable and needs care and a t tention , 
as the body needs care if it is to grow. The formula tion of 
education l aid in early childhood forms the basis of the 
character. Because this is true, Pl ato would have the true 
nature of the gods and that which is god-like in man habit-
ually put before the eyes of the young. The child will be 
brought up in the belief that beings greater than himself act 
in a certain way, and their natural impulse to imitate will 
be utilized in the development of character.2 
All stories embodying false ideas must be excluded 
f r om the educational program. The writer should strive to 
present the good as it really is. "And the truth is that 
nature is good and must be described as such."3 The bulk of 
1. ~~ 377c-d. 
2. Rep., 377f. 
3. Rep., 378b. 
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Greek religious ideas consists of myths which, generally 
speaking, are false, though they may contain element s of 
truth. Instead of an authorized collection of historical 
books, they had a mass of mythical s tories variously col-
ored and pre sented. Some of them sang of the genius of 
poet s or artists, adventures of heroes; and others spoke of 
the torr id tales of the gods. The bulk of these myths could 
be pronounced misleading and therefore must not be admitted. 
The f a lseness of myths may be due to the ignorance of the 
writer, misrepresentation of facts, and time-lapse which 
prevents accuracy in details. Then, too, the myths can be 
untrue in another and more seri ous sense than dtfl3. t-o his tor-
ica l error. They may contradict fundamental ide-as due to 
moral, metaphysical, or logical inconsis tency. Therefore, 
the stories and myths which could contribute nothing posi-
tive to the development of character must be excluded f r om 
the state's program. 
The earliest type of education mus t begin by appeal-
ing t o the inner nature of the i nd ividual. From t he culti-
vation of this common groundwork, Plato passes onward to the 
development of the virtues within the soul. The poets, for 
thei r work to be admitted, must be teachers and philosoph-
ers. They are not to be ornamental luxuries in the comnlon-
wealth nor ca terers to the pleasure of the intelligentsia, 
but rather an integral part with work of their own--reveal-
ing the true nature of the divine, nerving the heart, and 
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chastening the emotions through the power of heroic efforts, 
and surround the mind with an atmosphere of health and 
beauty . Few poets ever live up to this, but at leas t a few 
had claimed it. The poet must be able to discriminate be-
t ween that which is low and unworthy and that which is help-
ful and beneficial. 
Dramatic poetry, whic h does not promote individual 
growth in direction of the good, can do considerable ha r m in 
the development of character. Such writers depend upon il-
lusion for success first of all; and secondly, their char-
acter continues to weaken by the over-stimulation of emo-
tions . The first charge may be made clearer if the ana logy 
of painting is used. Pa inting and such arts produce their 
effect by taking advantage of certa i n optical illusions. 
Similarly the poet takes advantage of illusions of feeling . 
He presents the aspects of character which a ppea l to him 
most. He likes to represent the emotional aspect of person-
ality with shifting lights and shadows, where the contrasts 
are strong and the shadows r apid. Success depends not upon 
rational jud gment of the audience, but rather upon the illu-
sory feelings of the moment which a im at i mmediate sa tisfac-
tion. If dramatic poetry is judged by meaning; it condemns 
itself to inferiority. The second charge against dramatic 
poetry was challenged by Aristotle. Plato disapproved of 
people who used the arts as a medium through which pent up 
emotions could be released. His condemnati on rest ,- on the 
8o 
thesis tha t if one gives away to emotions which are ex te r nal 
to him, sure l y he will react in a simila r way when similar 
ci r cumstances arise because he will find that his will ha s 
been weakened and his self-respect undermined.l 
Many evils can result f r om the ne glect of musical 
I 
education as pointed by Plato when discussing the decline of 
the soul. However, 
When a man surrenders himself to music, allowing his 
soul to be flooded through the channels of his ea rs 
with those sweet and soft and mournful airs •.• if 
he persists in subduing it to such incantations, he 
will end by melting it away altogether.l 
not 
Man mp.s_~continue to educate only the psychological 
a spect of himself, but should train the body in orde r to 
have a truly harmonious and music3l life. - Physical tr~ining 
must be i ncluded in educati on of the child and should begin 
in early childhood . 2 It is true that a sound and he lthy 
body is not enough to produce a sound mind, but it does have 
' power to affe ct the mind. Gymnastics are primarily concerned 
with the effect of the body on the soul. ·Of all the element s 
in training, Plato devotes more time t o diet and exercise. 
Between the ages of seventeen and twenty, physica l 
exercise should be pursued a lone to the exclusion of all ser-
ious mental work because "hard work e.nd sleep are enemies to 
study" and "tha t figure which a man makes in his gymnastic 
is one of the greatest tests of his character." The exercises 
1. Rep., 403a. 
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would discipline the body for the work of a soldier. Diet, 
too , was very i mportant. (Plato now brings in all that was 
known by the medical sciences in his day.) He · thought of 
the doctors as he did of the poets. They., like the poets, 
were misleading the people. Many of the long names given to 
diseases were mere inventions of the doctors to impress 
their patients, asserted Pla to. Any person who in contin-
ually going to see such a deceiver as a doctor should be as 
ashamed as a man who is always going to court ' tb get justice 
because he has none.l Modern educational practices can pro-
fit much by Plato's insight into this problem. Take a look 
at the ~ a.tglete who has no idea of doing anything except by 
force because his perceptions are clogged and dull f r om . 
exercise and lack of sleep. Such a lif e moves without grace 
or harmony. However, 
The sense of physical fitness fills a man -with self-
confidence and energy and makes him twice the man he 
was. But suppose he does nothing else and holds aloof 
from any sort of culture •.• such a man ends by being 
wholly uneducated and a hater of reason.2 
The purpose of education is to bring these two ele-
ments, music and gymnastics, together--"to bring them into 
tune with one another by adjusting the tension of each to the 
right pitch." The person who applies both kinds of education 
to the soul and blends them in perfect proportion will be 
master of himself. 
1. fuuLt.., l.to9e • 
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Education is continuous and does not end at any de-
finite time. It is, however, divided into pe~iods. The 
first fifteen years of life are spent in nourishing the soul 
on the arts and physical education. After the fifteenth 
birthday, the student is introduced to theology, which deals 
with powers beyond the control of man. The weeding-out pro-
cess begins at this point, and the warrior is s-eparated from 
the worker. The failures are assigned the dut~es of a r ti-
sans , farmers, and the like. Those who pass the test . receive 
ten more years of training in mind, body, and character. At 
the end of this period a more difficult test is given. 
Those who fail are assigned positions as defenders and con-
stitute the warrior class of the city. 
In order to console the ones who had f~iled these 
examinations, Plato said, 
Citizens, you are brothers, yet God has framed 
you differently. Some of you have the power of com-
mand; and these he has made of gold, wherefore, they 
have the grea test honor; others of silver, to be · 
auxiliaries; others again, who are to. be husbandmen 
and craftsmen, he has made of brass and iron; and 
the species will be generally preserved in .. the 
children. But as you are of the same o-ri.ginal fami-
ly, a golden parent will sometimes haye a silver 
son, or a silver parent a golden son. 
The ones of "golden metal" who passed the examina-
tion at thirty are brought into the light of philosophy. 
The purpose of philosophy is t o teach them to think clearly 
and rule wisely. To achieve this aim, the training must be 
1 •. Rep., 415. 
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more highly specialized. Five years would be devoted to the 
study of metaphysics to enable students to rise . above the 
harsh realities of everyday existence to the l9fty realm of 
contemplation. They mus·t not remain in the world of eter-
nals too long but should return to the world of appearances 
and become lifters of the people. ouring periods of the re-
turn, all manners of temptation are presented to the stri-
ving philosopher--money to fee d the appetite of ambition, 
sensual indulgence for the . emotional appetlt<e ; ' vanity f or 
the appetite of pride. If they are able to control and 
overcome these appetites through courage and endurance , they 
will be ready to rule at fifty. These survivors, having 
been subject ed to the pleasures and sorrows of the world and 
having experienced contentment in knowledge of the good, 
would then possess enough theoretical and practical wisdom, 
without any cr ippling intellectual pride remaining, to be-
come philosopher-kings~ 
After the development of a group of philosopher-
kings, the second phase of the reformation has actualized, 
in which authority to rule is based on wisdom. Because rul-
ing is an art, the artist must be properly trained. 
Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and 
princesses of this world have the spirit and power 
of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom 
meet in one, and those commoner natures who either 
to the exclusion of the other are compelled to 
stand aside, cities will never have rest from their 
evils, ••• no, nor the human race, as I believe, 
• . • and then only will this our state have a pes-
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sibility of life and behold the light of day.l 
The third step in the reformation of the state is a 
startling one for Plato's age. He felt that there must be 
an equaliza tion of the sexes if the ideal state were to be-
come real. Women should be subjected to the same educa tion 
as men. They were to undergo the athletic tr-aining as well 
as the musical. They, too, would be given t-ests at the ages 
of twenty and thirty. It would be possible for women to be-
come rulers, but this was highly improbable. Women differed 
in degree of knowledge althouep not in kind. They would 
have the opportunity of fulfilling their functions as indi-
viduais in the just sta t e. As Plato said, 
Natural gifts are to be found here and there in both 
creatures alike; and every occupation is opened to · 
both, so far as their nature s are concerned; though 
woman is for all purposes the weaker~2 
Because the unity of the state could be assured only 
if the rulers and militia were loyal, there would be a com-
munity of families and goods among the two upper classes. 
Repulsive as this may sound, it reveals keen insight, for if 
all men and women are brothers and sisters, their first loy-
alty will be to the state and not to an individual family. 
The ruler would not be interested i n private ~oods for his 
family, for he -would be a part of the entire community and 
would will what was best for it. Although the wives and 
1. Rep., 473. 
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children would be held in common, there would be no toler-
ated promiscuity. Sexual intercourse would be . controlled by 
the rulers, who ruled by their wis dom.l (The de t ails of such 
regulations were not clearly outlined by Plato.) This type 
of communal living would apply only to the rulers and guard-
ians. The merchants, farmers, artisans, and such (because 
they woul d support the state financially) would be allowed 
to maintain private families and private goods. Thi s reward 
would really be a bribe which would enable the le~s intelli-
gent beings to be happy in their lowly positions. 
Since it is possible for children to inherit tenden-
cies from their parents, fourthly, a program of eugenics 
will be necessary. The mating of superior men 'and women is 
encouraged in order to produc e offspring who could rule 
wisely and justly. In h±s later days, Plato went so far as 
to suggest that the children of inferior par ents should be 
placed on the mountain sides to die! Of cou~s~, this was a 
common practice in his day, but Plato is the man who sug- . 
gested the possibility of "golden" children c oming from 
"brass" parents! 
I n summary: The just state would be possible only 
through an all inclusive system of education. The rulers 
would be philosophers who were subjected to the training of 
the state and excelled in all areas. These rulers, as well 
2. &ut:.' 461. 
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as the guardians , would live in a c omr:un1 ty an'd would share 
wives, children, and goods; for if all was snared, the r e 
would be li t tle opportunity for jea lousy and selfishness. 
This sta te would be supported by the workers , defended by 
the guardians, and ruled by the philosophers. 
Even after the arriva l of such a just state , decline 
is inevi t able. According to Plato there is a fatal law of 
degenera tion in human as well as in state affa irs, and be-
cause society and t he individual are similar to each othe r , 
t he degenerati on of character can be compar ed to the decline 
of the state. That degeneration is a part of the process of 
life is evident in the world of appearance, where all is 
change. Rise, withering away , and f ina lly decay to r ise 
again is the picture of earthly existence. Degener at i on 
· follows a cycle in the life of man as well a s in the life of 
a society.l As such, it is inevitable and cannot be checked. 
Althou gh the degeneration of personality can be compared with 
the fall of the state, this does not mean that each indivi-
dual in a certain soc i ety corresponds to t he society in 
which he lives. A truly good life may be lived i n a corrupt 
and decadent socie t y. (In this obser vance lies the hope for 
better socia l conditions in the future.) Man, as we said 
before, determines the final and formal ends of socie ty and 
is not completely a product of its influence. It is an 
1. Rep., 544a-c. 
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oversimplification to say that the individual is a reflec-
t ion of the state or, in Plato's words, that t he state is 
the individual "writ large." He is more than a smaller re-
production of society if he allows rational nature to deter-
mine what in his communal living is best for him. It must 
be remembered that social forces aid in the development of 
life through education and hygienic precautions, but life 
itself must be lived by the individual. He alone can seek 
ultimate truth and know when it has been found. As Plato 
said, the •individual must lead and society must follow in 
order for progress to take place.l Such is not true in the 
degeneration of the state, however, because social corrup-
tion can pervert the individual. This fact is cl~arly il-
): 
lustrated in Book VIII of the Republic, where in ; ~ach case 
, .. ' 
.'( 
social decay precedes individual decay and acceler,tes indi-
. ·, 
vidual degeneration. 
.• I \ 
. \ 
The decay of socie t y may be well begtin whenj.. th~ 
philosopher is the ruler. He is a lover of truth · ah~ ~eal-
. \ 
\ 
izes that only truth can keep a man humble and detach.d from 
' '\ 
worldly ambition. Without this philosophical h~ilit~.\ 
pride begins to show itself, and ambition take's ~he pl~ce of 
justice. 2 Here the subjective rationalization ,~f life! h.e-
gins, and the honor loving or timocratic man appears t\p Ae-
; . I\\ 
place the philosopher. 
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The greed and avarice of men makes some of them dis-
satisfied with the just life they are living. Because of the 
fatal law of degeneration, men soon tire of what they have 
and long for what they do not have. The rulers begin to 
wonder what it would be like to have a private family and 
property. Soon their desires become strong enough to make 
them act. Once they have tasted the lust for riches and 
luxury, the simple life is not for them.l The rulers want 
power to protect their goods; and because of this wea lth, 
they gain control of the government. 
This new government is a timocracy, which is charac-
terized as courageous and ambitious. It becomes a militar-
istic state ! needed by the wealthy people and the rule r s for 
protection. The gaining of wealth would triumph over the 
love of justice, and its accumulation would be the a im of 
the rulers. As a result, the people would be heavily taxed 
and without political rights. 
The timocratic person is attracted by reason and im-
pressed by culture , but he possesses neither. He is sober , 
useful , respected , and values the law of pr ofit. He may be 
referred to as the "self-made man." In his ha-ste for imme-
diate wealth he builds up a heap of accumulate.d wrongs ; 
' 
' 
which eventually destroys him as the timocratic state is 
destroyed by the wronged populace. This type or persoh is 
governed by opinions and reflections of the status guo ~ He 
looks for immediate results and has little regard :for long 
1. Rep., 546a. 
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range hopes and fears. Very soon he will begin to merge his 
desire for honor with his desire for power. He will crush 
all who stand in his way in gaining power. Power will seek 
to become more powerful, and very soon he will be drunk on 
his success. At such a time he will realize that his ambi-
tion will become actualized only if he has puw~r, and to 
have power he must have money. The honor-loving man then 
becomes a lover of money. 1 
The money-loving or oligarchic man has lost the 
gleam of reality which was possible only throu~h rational 
insight. His reason has become an instrument for his appe-
tite. It aids him in satisfying as many desi~es as ·possible 
and controling his striving and aspiration• . The money-lov-
ing man is torn asunder by the very structure of his appe-
tites which falls into conflict. It is necessary for a cer-
tain amount of work to be done in order to satisfy the ex-
pectations of the appetite yet there. Then the accumulation 
of material goods becomes an end and all else must be sacri-
fic ed, even the fulfillment of other desires. Herein lies 
the conflict. This man wants power , but power is no good 
unless it is used. If it is used, then it becomes less pow-
erful. He will become t wo personalities instead of a uni-
fied one. One part of him will become niggardly, and · the 
repressed part will become rebellious and impatiently await 
1. ~' 553d. 
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a chance for expression. Like the oligarchic~l state, ''Such 
a man will be at war with himself."l His life would swing 
between r epressive discipline and wasteful es~ape. Each 
self will become more and more different from the other and 
more and more antagonistic toward the other. All discipline 
finally breaks down, and he gives way to the flood of fam-
ished desires.2 
When only desires remain to control the human body, 
necessary and unnecessary appetites cannot be distinguished 
f rom each other. Such a being npasses through the day in-
dulging each chance a ppetite."3 One idea to him is as good 
as another, and he rejects the one which affords the leas t 
i ntensity o-r immediate plea sur e. This type of individua l is 
c ompared to the democratic socie t y, which is standardless 
and chaotic, a state of self-indulgence and anarchy. 
Out of ~his confused, standardless state a leader 
arises. The so-called hero persuades the hel~less masses to 
follow him with promises of peace and securi t~. When he has 
control over the state, he keeps it in perpet\fal wars in or-
der to drain the energies of the people and keep them weak. 
Meanwhile he is b~coming stronger and the citizens become 
mor~ and more dependent upon him. Drunk with his increasing 
powers, he becomes a tyrant whose word is law. The recently 
1. Rep., 554A2. 
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e. 
acquired privileges are snatched away and once more t he peo-
ple become political puppets manipulated by the ruler.l 
This state is the worst one of all, and any change occurring 
would be for the better. The people are depressed , and many 
are without hope. They are kept in check by fear, but a few 
courageous ones even under such a government work for a rev-
olution. 
The growing power of the tyrant doe.s -not make him 
happy. He fears more for his life with each acquired piece 
of wealth. He reaches the point where he can trust no one 
and thinks the world is plotting against him. However, he 
is a powerful, dynamic figure who obeys only one law, t he 
law of self-assertion. Demos compares the strength of t his 
dictator with that of the philosopher. 2 Each has a unified 
goal in life, but the philosopher is ruled by his reason 
and the tyrant by his appetite. 
The tyrannized life is subordinated as a whole to a 
single f ixed idea and achieves the solipsism of a singl e 
martyr passion. Guiding his actions against any t hreatening 
power, he appears to have courage when he is a f raid . He is 
af r aid of ·his enemies and more afraid of his companions . 
More and more he withdraws from everyone and lives i n his 
narrow world in a miserable and enclosed condition. The 
more power he gains, the more miserable he becomes, because 
1. ReQ_., 562a. 
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he has more to lose and more to fear for. The tyrant is the 
most miserable of men as the tyrannized state is the most 
miserable of states. 
Although the tyrant has supressed all the traces of 
reason and yielded to the temptation of the flesh all the 
way, Plato does not let us forget that he is still a man--
a miserable man. His misery is a product of the life he has 
chosen, but there is still hope for redemption in such a · 
man. There is something about the human soul that cannot 
fade away. It is a truly amazing fact that puman life can 
persist under corrupted and vicious conditions. It refuses 
to die even when denied and repressed by the tyrannical 
person. 
It is evident from this account of the inversion of 
human character that regardless of socia l conditions or any 
other conditions the soul will survive. That which makes a 
man a human cannot be lost. The inversion of character has 
been traced from the true life of reason to the artificial 
existence of passions; it is a downward regression of the 
conquest of reason by the appetite. It is a realistic pic-
ture of man as he is today and was yesterday. The same old 
struggles are going on; it is the universal picture of man 
as he is. Man as he is, however, is not man as he should 
be. The "ought" is quite a distance from the "is." Indivi-
duals may be placed in any rung along the inverted order; 
and until each is at the top, there is need for a reformation 
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as Plato so clearly indicates. 
In summary: Plato's original aim for construction 
of a just state was to define the just man. Because the 
state is a larger organic whole than man, the' relation of 
parts can be more clearly determined. The just state is the 
harmonious state in which all levels of society fulfill 
their places. These places have been assigned by the philo-
sopher-kings as previously stated. The three classes of 
society are the working class composed of the merchants, 
farmers, artisans, and such; the guardian class composed of 
the military defenders; and the rulers, who are trained 
philosophers. 
In the ideal state the workers, who are members of 
the lower class, are not depraved crea tures made to work. 
T~ey have a life apart from the state as well as one with 
the state. Each man's soul is a mixture composed of appe-
tite, spirit, and reason. The artisan is one who allows his 
appetite to control his reason and will. Therefore, he is 
not able to control himself without the aid of laws. The 
virtue of this group is temperance. Temperance may be de-
fined as moderation. Of course, the less intelligent man is 
not without reason; and he can use his reason to control his 
appetite. Because of his nature, however, he cannot become 
a tempera te self without assistance. This assistance he 
ge t s in the required twenty years of training. 
The warrior class possesses the virtue of moderation 
94 
e· 
and must develop courage. It is the duty of the guardian to 
protect the. city and the private property of the citizen. 
They are not to become lax in their duties but must be ready 
to cooperate with the rulers .at all times. Their private 
lives are closely connected with those of the rulers because 
the two classes live in the same community an~ share wives 
and goods. The guardians are the good watch dogs who never 
sleep; they think first of the well-being of the citizens 
and are ready at all times to protect the · group. 
The philosopher-kings constitute the ruling group. 
These persons are reluctant rulers who long to contemplate 
on the Good. Their one desire is to rule ~ustly, for they 
have been trained to do this by being exposed to practical 
knowledge and tested on theoretical knowledge. The philo-
sophers represent reason in the state and make the laws 
which regulate the life and work of the members of the other 
groups. 
The just state becomes a reality only when these 
three groups are operating harmoniously. The philosophers 
guide, the warriors protect, and the workers support the 
state. In each group each member has a definite part to 
play; and if one fails, the entir~ unit suffers. It is the 
same as having a broken nose. The nose does not receive the 
pain alone, but the entire body reacts to the pain. 
The ideal state is controlled by reason, but this is 
not to be construed to mean that the philosopher is the only 
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person who possesses this virtue, for it is a part of each 
individual. The philosopher merely has more of an abundance 
of it. Reason may be defined as the appreciation of the 
Good, or the apprecia tion of ·values. Each man can be rea-
sonable under such a definition, but his degree of wisdom 
varies. Reason aims at both personal and private goods be-
cause essentially all goods ar e a part of the universal 
Good. The universal Good is superpersonal and all inclu-
sive.l 
The ideal of reason is one of wholeness, union of 
opposites, and moderation. The philosopher is a rational 
man, but he is a whole man. He combines intelligence with 
passions and receives more pleasure than does appetitive 
man because he realizes the need for moderation. There must 
be a union of opposites by reason in order to act moderately. 
Moderation is the middle path of the two extremes; therefore 
the just state is operated according to the principles of 
organic unity, scientific management, and purposiveness 
throughout. However, this ideal state is not an end in it-
self, but it is a means of supporting the good life for each 
indiv1du~l. 2 
In this chapter the quest wa s to find a state; in-
stead, a man was found. Whether Plato's ideal state ever 
comes into existence or not, it is clear that such a state 
1. ~' 71. 
2. Demos, PP, 375. 
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can be built within the life of man. Following Socrates' 
discussion of the state, it was not clear where the leader 
would be led. Now it is seen that Plato holds the state to 
be one of the fundamental conditions of human life and is 
judging it by its moral and educational functions. In this, 
tbe true state, the standard is not sheer power or force, 
but rather man, who as a soul is the source of values in the 
world. By using this criterion with strict logic to purify 
the existing state, Plato has left at last nothing but the 
"inner state within the soul." He holds that the self-re-
formation of the individual must be the starting point of a 
new order. He puts forward a startling principle: realize 
the true state in your own soul. The essence of Plato's 
state is not in its eternal structure but in its metaphysical 
nucleus, the idea of absolute reality and value around which 
it is built. Therefore, 
the man who succeeds in realizing the divine order 
in his soul has made a greater contribution to the 
realization of ?late's state than he who constructs 
an entire city which externally resembles Plato's 
political scheme but is deprived of its divine es-
sence, the Idea of fhe Good, the source of perfec-
tion and happiness. 
1. Jaeger, Paid., 355--356. 
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SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
Plato's doctrine of man unlocks the door to the ex-
pansive wealth of hie philosophic thought. Man 1s· the con-
necting point betwee.n the World of Appearances and the ~ orld 
of Ideas. In other words, he is a bridge between imperfec-
tion and perfection, incompletion and completion. But what 
is the nature of man which enables him to maintain such an 
exalted position? 
Man is composed of two distinct parts, which Plato 
designated as body and soul. The body is the organic unit 
which supplies a locus for the soul. In other wo.rds, 1 t is 
the outer manifestation of the real person. Because the 
body exi t .J in and is a product of the world of things, 1 t 
is a subject to the very same laws which govern other empi-
rical "things." It responds to stimulations of varied 
sort s , grows with age, blooms, and then dies away. It, too, 
waxes and wane s in the t wilight of life. Here man is most 
akin to the World of Appearances. He exists in bo dily form 
among "things," and unle ss be is able to transcend what is 
given by the senses, he will be stuck on the level of sen-
suality. But how can man, living in the sensible world and 
being a part of it, rise above that which surrounds him? 
The answer may be found when viewing the individual. There 
are two element or. whieh he is composed; one is the body, 
which is akin to the physical world, and the other is the 
soul, which is eternal. 
The true nature ot the soul remains el.us1ve after 
reading Plato's dialogues. Hie peripheric di scus s ions are 
partially due to the tact that euper-sensibles (Kantian 
language) cannot adequately be described in ordinary every 
day language. Concepts to be understood must be presented 
in an intelligent fashion. For Plato realized that no one 
had the right to be obscure. Hence, he used poetry and 
mythology to express. his ideas in a clearer and more easily 
understood medium. Bowever, "'.. vague though hie descriptions 
of the soul may be, they are the central point in his 
thought. The soul forms the connection between the · two 
worlds; it is the hub of existence. Without the soul the 
world of change and appearance would become meaningles s and 
valueless; for there would be no communication between it 
and the Realm of Ideas, which are meaningful. 
A discusAion of the nature or the. soul will not be 
complete without reference to i .ts origin and destiny. 
These two points are moat speculative or all. In the Ti-
-
maeus, souls were created by the Demiu:;r:g~ and placed on a 
star. While in the Phaedrus and Republic the origin is 
passed over and its improvement is discussed. Plato is 
sure that the sou~~ created and in a definite number. 
Regardless of whether they visited on a star or journeyed 
through faraway lands, as in the myth ot Er, they were ot a 
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definite number. Souls reappear time and time again 
throughout the course of time. Plato, as the Indian mystics, 
refers tm this process as transmigration, while Heitzsche 
gives it a moral twist and calls it 'recurrence.• Another 
point emphasized by Plato .is relation to the destiny of the 
soul is that the soul chooses the body and the life that it 
will live. All future choices, as pointed out before, are 
outgrowths of past ones. For example, some of the sainte 
of another age who had lived a pleasant life grew careless 
and would choose a worthless existence and would then 
s cream of their mistakes before they de scended to the 
world. Soule, however, are not thought of asselt-generated. 
They were all created during the same time, and being eter-
nal they will live throughout time • . Their value is due to 
the fact that they are eternal, have gazed at the forms, 
and have the possibility of recognizing them ' even during 
their earthly existence through contemplation. The entire 
cycle of the souls' existence is aimed at their further 
development. Desiring to learn more the soul descends into 
body, dies, and on ita heavenly journey still picks know-
ledge. 
What ~$ it that causes the soul to continue to 
search for something that it does not have? Why does the 
soul feel incomplP.te and inadequate? Within each man there 
is an inward drive toward perfection. Plato calls this 
dynamic force ~- It oompelle man to move beyond the world 
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of imagery and opinion to one of eternal stability. This 
is the real connecting link between the two worlds. For 
this reason, man is able to give value to the world of things. 
He realizes that many of the 16 things 11 .are good tor some 
specific purpose. 'l'hrough communication with the world of 
ideas man discovers how to utilize these particulars and 
endow them with external value. 
All men, however, are not able to rise above the 
world of flux, · $1though this unique force which strives 
for completeness permeates their inner beings. Why? The 
soul of man is composed ot thr ee elements which are desig-
nated as a host of appetites, spirit, and reason. The appe-
tites constitute the largest portion of the soul for they 
are more closely connected. with the urges and drives of the 
body. Because appetites can be so demanding in their hun-
ger for i m.nediate satisfaction, most men are led by them. 
Spirit is the most di.fficul t element of the soul to under-
stand. What is commonly meant by will, as mind in action, 
more clearly depic~ Plato's meaning of spirit. It cooper-
ates readily with reason and is willing to carry out its 
demands. Reason should be the ruling factor of the soul. 
When it is dominant, eros is free to direct the soul toward 
-
eternal things. But the degree that each element exists in 
the individual aoul differs. Hence, many and varied types 
of individua~appear. Some are ruled by passions; others, 
. guided by reason; and many remain indifferent.. There are 
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those who cannot pe categorized but fluctuate or fall be-
tween classifications. 
It is the soul which renders man a center of value, 
not his body or any other externality. He is valuable be-
cause of his kinship with the Forme. Having viewed the 
Ideas, man can contribute more to the external world in 
VJhich hie body exists. He is on the line between these two 
worlds and transmits value as well as meaning from the 
World of Forms to the World of Appearances. Man, however, 
is not satisfied with gazing at the Forms alone; he is di-
rected by the power ot eros t o the Id P- a ot the Good. The 
Good is the source and sustainer of all of value . in the 
co smos. It is the magnet which draws man above the world 
of sensations. It is Plato's God. The Idea of the Good 
forms the heart of Plato's metaphysics, but its position 
is of no greater importance than that of man. Without man, 
the Good would not be knovm and its power would be worth-
less. Man alone can realize it as a source of values and 
strive to bring all that exists into its light. Again it 
ie seen that Plato neec1e man to eXplain even the Good ·! 
Although man is made up of two distinct parts, body 
and soul, only one portion should rule. Reason, which is 
the highest part of the soul, should control the individual 
because it can plan and make poeaible the execution or such 
plans through commanding the lower parts of the soul. The 
duty of the bod'y is to make the execution of such plans 
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eas ier. It i s clearly seen that the soul 1s superior to 
t he body in all re spects. The soul i s not only the guiding 
and motivating principle, but it i s al so a seat of values ; 
i t i s et ernal a nd s elf-moving . Becaus e the ~oul i s so pre-
cious , i t mus t be oared for in a very special way. In 
other \lo'Ord.s, the SOUl mus t b e nurtured fro m infancy through 
to death . To me et t his need man muat have an organized s ys-
tem of education. ~he aim of education i s t he nurture of 
t he soul; the soul must recognize the Good and realize that 
reality may diff er from the obvious. Such an education 
takes a long time, longer even than a lifetime; therefore 
i t must begin early in order to help the individual throw 
off the chains of ignorance and r evel in t he light of t he 
sun longer. 
Such a sys tem of educa tion a s Plato proposed i s 
i mpossible wi t hout the aid or an organized s tate. There is 
no s t a t e in exi ~ t · nce whi ch may be likened to hi e idea l 
s t a te. Even he admi t ted it was only a s i gnpost or a guide. 
Here in lies a great weaknes s--the ideal s t a te mus t hav e 
l eader "' who have been trained under the proposed ne~ s ys tem 
o~ education, yet the s ys tem of education cannot material-
ize until such a s tat e a s described in the Rexubl1c has been 
realized . Perhaps .. lato meant that a f e\· great thinker' s 
could arise without thi s specialized tra i ning and they 
could begi n the much needed reformation. However, t he 
probl em i s seen; there 1s too much wi shful t hinki ng a nd not 
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enough data tor practical application. This, however, is 
not a criticism against his theoretical view or man, but 
rather a sigh and wonderment or how this individual can be 
produced . 
Plato' s doctrine or man is sound and conveys keen 
insight into the character or human nature. His account of 
the development of character through a mixed life as urged 
in the Philebua reveals the genius or the man. Plato had 
the uncanny power of analyzing man as a social, biological, 
and rational animal. It would not be too difficult to be-
lieve that he had studied man a s the laboratory· technologist 
studied ants, their habits and their habitat. He views man 
from afar and accurately describes and portrays the things 
which are closest to their hearts and minds. He depicts 
and makes place for the little things as well as the stir-
ring events in man's mind. Yet he never forgets the great 
worth and value of mankind through such an analysis. . Al.-· 
though Plato is vague at spots, when discussing the origin 
and destiny of the soul (but who isn't?), all any thinker 
can or has c·ontributed to hie theory of man is fresher in-
terpretations and expanded explanations. The greatest num-
ber or criticisms have been leveled at Plato when he at-
tempts to outline a plan by which the development could 
take place. He insulted the institution or monogamy, denied 
freedom to the artist, and became ambiguous when speaking 
of the individual and the state in the Republic. The state 
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is to promote the growth and development of character, yet 
he ha s men such as the artist sacr1f1c ed,,. for the good of 
the state. It is imposs ible for the state to be totally or-
ganic and for individuals to be free, rational, and centers 
of values. These two concept s cannot be reconciled. Plato 
left one with a vague start of an unfinished task on this 
i s sue. Again thie is attacking his political theory and 
not hls theory of ma.n directly. If history 1s any indica-
tion of importance, Plato's doct rine of man mus t be given , 
fir st place. Hie influence i s still f elt in our civiliza-
tion. , 
After two thousand years Plato's influence is still 
felt. The character of any sys tem or present-day thought 
is determined by it s relation to h1s. 'l'he doctrine of man 
whlch he expounded has had a deep and lasting influence on 
the Christian concept or man which ls embodied in so-called 
Western thought. The shadow of Plato hovers over philosophy 
a s the shadow of Jesus Christ tints Christian theology . It 
is lar ely due, however, to his influence on Christian 
thought that his teachings were preserved and pa ssed on to 
posterity. As Taylor says, 
To few men does the world owe a heavier debt than 
to Plato. He has taught us that •philosophy,• 
loving and single-minded devotion to truth, is the 
great gift of God to man and the rightful guide of 
man's life, and that the few to whom the intimate 
vis ion of truth has been granted are false to their 
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calling unle ss they bear fruit 1n unwearied and 
humble service to their fellows.l 
Platonic thought entered the stream ot Christianity 
very early. This was due largely to .the influence ot Plo-
tinus, who was the last of genius among Greek philo sophers . 
Plotinus and hie followers called themselves 1 Platon1sts,• 
and they believed that they were reviving the true philo-
sophy ot Plato . The Neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato 
is dominated by the passion for a tully articulate vision of 
the world as a structural unity. Plot1nus tri~s to bridge 
the gap between the Ideas and Platonic theory of science by 
relying on the passage in the Republic about the Goo4 which 
is the source and su~tainer of ·,all things . Thus he and his 
I 
forerunners constructed the famous scale or ladder ot •em-
anations• which connects all. Whenever one comes under the 
influence of •scales ot value• and 1 ladders ot perfection• 
in Christian theology, he is dealing with the influence or 
Plato transmitted by Plotinus. It there had been little to 
offer to Christianity in Platonic thought, Plotinus would 
not have succeeded. The greatest appeal is due to Plato's 
ethical theory of man. He introduces t wo astounding concepts 
which were Christian-like, so that many of the early- ohuroh 
fathers declared he had been taught by Moses. In the 
Gorgias , Plato emphasized the points that the good man will 
not harm hie enemies and that it i s better to suffer than 
1. Taylor, Pla. , J. 
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to do wrong. His ethics resembles Ohriatianity not only in 
content, but partially also in spirit.l Both may be called 
ethics ot renunciation, or negation of the will, and other-
worldly. Both, as Re1tzsche would say, are the ethics ot the 
slave opposed to that ot the superman. The question that 
both Christ and Plato constantly challenge one with is, 
"What shall it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose 
his own sou1? 12 
Another reason tor his influence is because he re-
Jected materialism and affirmed the primacy or the soul. 
The entire elaborate system ot education he proposed had. one 
paramount goal 1n mind, the nurture or the soul. Because 
the soul grows and develope the proper environment should be 
provided for it. J'or this reason he oen.aured mythology be-
cause it was largely false; in tact he proposed to censure 
all art because it had such a strong influence upon young 
and tender minds. Here Plato's inconsistency comes up again. 
He forgot that muzzles are tor animals and not tor men. How 
could he expect the artist to develop into the best possible 
poet, painter, or such it his freedom were limited and his 
work dictated? Again Plato has to make it clear if society 
is composed of a group or autonomous individuals or if ft is 
an organic whole. Yet his conception of the immortalit;r or 
/ . 
the soul and the mythical pictures of future :reward·s and / . 
1. Shorey, PAM, 72. 
2. M&.tt., 16:26. 
./ 
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punishments were appealing to the Church Fathers . Platonism 
came into Western thought largely through three channels--
Augustine, Boeth1us, and Dionysus. The Plato who influenced 
them was aee.n largely through the medium of Plotinus. In 
different and varied waya the Platonic conception ha s em-
erged again and aga in in history. When Leibniz and !fe~"ton 
discovered the calculus in the seventeenth century, they 
were going back to the mathematica l ideas originated in the 
first generation of the Academy. Even such a recent fi gure 
as Whitehead takes the general view or nature a e stated by 
Timaeus for his starting point. It is impossible to over-
estimate Plato's contributions to and influence upon the 
'modern mind, and any attempt made to do so would be inade-
quate and lacking 1n many respects . The simple statement 
that Platonic ideas have become part of the unconscious in-
heritance of the educated man may partially convey some idea 
of the extent and depth of his influence. 
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EPILOGUE 
All modern views of man are adaptations, trans-
formations and varying interpretations of two primary con-
cepts: (1) the classical view of man, (2) the Christian 
view of man. To understand and appreciate the modern con-
flicts in regard to human nature, it is necessary to see 
hi s torically the modern concept ot man in relation to these 
traditional views. This, however, is clearly another story 
and cannot be retQld here~ But the conflicts have not yet 
been resolved and modern culture remains somewhat ot a 
battleground for these two opposing views of human nature. 
At present the modernized classical view of man seems to 
have triumphed. An investigation of the basic premise of 
the classical argument may shed light on this analysis. 
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The classical view of man is made up primarily of 
Platonic, Aristotelian, and 5toio conceptions of human 
nature. Many varying features are included in this con-
cept, but there is one primary common factor--the unique-
ness of man's rational faculties. 1 This uniquiness i s his 
nous wh1oh may be translated as 1 spirit1 with primary em-
phasi s upon thought and raason. In Plato, .!l2Y.§. is the high-
est element in the soul, and the other two being the spirit-
ed and appetitive mand 1s sharply distinguished from the 
body and becomes the organizing and unifying princi_ple of 
1. Niebuhr, DM, 6. 
the soul. Plato's conception ot r:1 ind and matter leads 
toward an implicit dualism. The consequences ot such 
doctrines have led to two ideas which in some ways pre-
determine any theory of man based on ideas which in some 
ways predetermine any theory of man based on ideas which 
in some ways predetermine any theory ot man based on class-
ical rationalism and dualism: (1) The concept that reason 
and divinity are equated. (2) Dualism identities the body 
with evil and assume the goodness of mind or spirit. (This 
body-mind dualism and the value-Judgments pas sed upon both 
body and mind as Niebhur points out, stand in aha.rpest 
contrast to the B1bl1oal view ot man and achieve a ~ateful 
I 
t"nfluence 1n all subsequent theories or human nature.l 
•The Bible knows nothing of a good mind and an evil body~" 
Although Platonic thought is predominant in the 
classical view ot man, it ie not the Classical View. In-
-
fluence or Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions must be con• 
sidered as determining factors plus many minute oontr1b~~ 
tiona ot d1st1ngu1shable and indistinguishable origin. 
As previously noted the influence or Platonism 
upon the classical view of man, which in turn influenced 
the modern view, is abiding. Niebuhr points out that 
Platonism draws the most obvious, immediate, and plausible 
conclusions about the character of human creativity. Be-
l. Niebuhr·· DM, VI, 7. 
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cause man has the capacity to torm and reform the impulses 
ot nature into new and more inclusive patterns, his crea"T 
tive capacity is identified with reason. At this point 
Niebuhr levels, and rightly so, a negative criticism. 
Plato does not recognize that the anarchic 1m-
pulses which the •soul" brings into subJection 
are more than mere bodily impulses. They are 
impulses which have been given their freedom 
by the fact that man is spirit as well as na-
ture. Plato thus falsely identifies anarchy 
with bodily impulse~l 
Ideally the soul is the principle of organization and 
order in the body, but this is not the entire story. In 
the l?haedo, Plato admits that the soul "is almost always 
oppos ing and coercing the elements of which she is be-
lieved to be composed"~ This obviously indicates that th 
there are inner conflicts within man that will cause him 
to stand in contradiction to himself, unless there is a 
possible transcendency of human spirit. Man is not body 
and soul, or body or soul, but a unity--a capacity to tran-
scend both the body and the soul. 
Plato's theory ot human nature is in harmony with this 
metaphysics and cannot be declared invalid because of in-
consistency. But it opens way, in tact prompts, the ro-
mantic charge that reason enervates and destroys feelings . 
Plato would declare that he had been misinterpreted; but 
by identifying spirit with reason and equating creativity 
1. Niebuhr., DM, VI, 30. 
2. Phi., j20a. 
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with the capacity to discipline a previously given vitality 
into order, the relation of reason to impulse becornes neg-
ative. He speaks or "the ten thousand oases of 9PPOSition 
of the ' ·oul to the things or the body." 1 
A poe1 t1 ve relation between reason and impu,lse is 
portrayed in the Platonic concept of gr·O's. Eros repre• 
sents the natural des1rea and •italitiea as they are trans-
formed or sublimated rather than as being repressed by r~­
£on . . In the famous t~gure of the charioteer, this is 
further illustrated, tor reason guides the steers toward 
divine beauty. This indicates a positive rather than a 
negat ive relationship between reason and bodily desires. 
(This i s also evidence of difficulty invo l ved in attempt-
ing to systematize Plato's doctrine of man). 
In spite of Plato's deification of mind (which some-
times resulted in asceticism, as in the Phaedo), Plato re-
mained, as Baker says, a genuine humanist. 
He dignifies man by insisting that hie highest 
faculty is rational knowledge bX which he knows . 
timeless and i mmutable reality."" .'~; .. ,· 
1. Phaed., 120b. 
B.~.P:.!', DM, 102 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to present Plato's 
doctrine of man in a systematic fashion by relating the 
individual to the coemos, to society, to man, and ·to him-
self. It is necessary to see man in relation to all these 
. 
forces and influences in order to understand his purpose 
' 
and desires. The strongest desir~e within each human 
breast ie a. feeling to belong. - Man wants to belong to 
eomethin5 or someone. If he finds the universe unfriendly, 
he can turn to society; from society, he · may turn to 
friends, and from friends to himself. The feeling of and 
desiring to be a part of everything leads man onward. It 
1s the compelling force in human existence. Yet, Plato 
points out, quite clearly man will never be satisfied to 
belong to one particular realm; he must feel that he is a 
part of all that is. The 1myortant issue is where do~s 
man fit into the scheme of things. 
To answer this ques.tion, the Republic ha.e been used 
ae a core; tor it represents the center point 1n Plato's 
thought. All hie previous works appear to be stepping 
stones leading to hie masterpiece, wh1le his later dia-
logues merely expand or interpret what a . lready appears in 
the Republic. His other dialogues, however, have been con-
sulted 1n order to understand the Republic better. The 
latter portion of the chapter •Man and the Good L1te•• wae 
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taken from the Philebus almost directly; and the discussion 
of eros in Chapter II relies heavily on the Symposium. 
This paper was divided into chapters a ccording to 
s ubject matter. The first chapter gives the hi s torical back-
ground. Plato's doctrine of man, a s his other themes, did 
not spring full born as :tUnerva did from the brow of Zeus. 
Instead, it was the result of an accumulative process. Long 
before his time the quest for knowledge of reality had be-
gun. Early writings prove that man, indirectly and then 
more directly, became the center of the philoeo~hic quest. 
Heraclitus and Socrates are to be remembered because of 
their influence on Plato, in whose writings the doctrine of 
man burst into bloom. Plato's theory of the World of Ap-
pea rances can be traced back to Heraclitus, and the Moral 
Stability of the World he owe s to Socrates. In sketching 
\ 
the background the Sophist s cannot be excluded. Without them 
there would have been no Socrates or Plato as they are known 
now. Both Socrates and Plato were fighting the ethical 
relativism of the Sophists, who declared tha t the natura l 
standard of human conduct is utility, ultimate enjoyment, 
or pleasure. 
Chapter II is a discussion or man's place in the 
cosmos as a me--taphysical entity. Plato realizes the neces-
sity of understanding one's own nature and purpose before 
attempting to know external events. Before an analysis of 
the structure of the soul is discussed, a review of hie 
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conception of~ is needed. 
~. in its highest form, is man's instinctive urge 
to develop his own higher self. It is man's metaphysical 
yearning after the ~,.;holeneaa which is forever impos s ible 
to the individual nature. The yearning shows man to be mere-
ly a fragment always striving to be reunited with its appro-
priate other self as long as he exists in helpless separa-
tion. In other words, eros is that which gives direction to 
life and leads to more life and better life. In the Sympo-
sium, ~is interpreted as love for the Good. In other 
words, it is what Plato means by philosophy--the yearning of 
the true self to take peace 't'li thin us. Eros, then, is the 
basic drive within the soul which has perfection as its 
goal. This drive is common in all men, but it is not all 
of the soul. If this were true, then there would be no dif-
ference between souls. 
What is the principle of differentia tion in souls? 
Before an answer can be attempted, an analysis of the struc-
ture of the inner self is necessary. The soul is divided 
into three distinct but inseparable elements. They are de-
signated as a host of appetites, spirit, and reason. The 
appetites constitute the largest portion of the soul and are 
more closely allied to the body. They aim at the immediate 
satisfaction of desires. The spirited element anticip.tes 
and is, therefore, passive until moved by reason, which, 
should be the ruling principle in the soul. These thr~e 
principles are not independent entities, but are inseparable 
and necessary components of the soul. In the actual living 
of life individualism is possible because of the varied de-
gree that each element influences the total personality. 
The best possible life can be lived only when the soul is 
controlled by reason, which has gained rational insight into 
the permanent structure of the universe and life in the 
world. 
The f act that the soul is the higher part of the self 
and the really real is more i ·mportant to Pla to than any dis-
cussion of its origin or destiny. Plato remains somewhat 
vague on the subject. Concerning the destiny of the soul, 
he is sure of its eternality. The basi c proof tha t he gives 
evolves around the soul's kinship to the eternal forms. No 
external force can destroy the soul, if de struction is pos-
sible; for only the soul can destroy itself by its own 
viciousness. 
Plato's conception of the soul illustra tes man's 
kinship with the Ideas. The soul is closer to the eternal 
forms, for it too is eternal. Because the soul has gazed 
upon perfect Ideas, it can strive to reproduce them in the 
everyday world of things. This leads to Ohapter III, in 
which the good life , is discussed. 
It is the Idea or the Good which dominates .this dis-
cussion of the ethical life of man. Discussion .of this con-
cept may be summarized as follows: (1) Logically, the · Good 
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is the principle of completeness which promotes order and 
harmony in the universe. (2) Ethically, the Good is the 
standard or norm for all values. It is tne end of all things 
as well as the cause. { 3) Socially, the Idea of the Good is 
the ideal of social organi zation which makes it possible for 
each individual to contribute his all for the common good. 
{4) Metaphysically, the Good is the first Form, that is, the 
first in importance, for particular things are good only 1n 
so f a r as they participate in the Idea of the Good. 
The Idea of the Good 1s that which is desired, com-
plete, and self-sufficient; and it is meas ure, beauty, and 
truth. The highest good for man must conform to the crite-
rion of the highest good before it can deserve such a name. 
What is the highest good for man? A.s far as can be deter-
mined from the Dialogues, the highest good for man is the 
development .of chara.cter. A life of character build ing is 
referred to as a life of reason. This does not mean sheer 
contemplation, for rea son ie the appreciation and promotion 
of values which ape necessary for a well-balanced life. A 
life of reason is one in w·hich reason and passions are har-
moniously combined. This is ge rierally speaking, for the 
development of character is personal, a tid each man must dis-
cover what hie function is and fulfill it the best he knows 
how. 
A good life, however, must be a virtuous ana. Vi~ 
tue comes from knowledge, and since this is possible, each 
1 22 
man will be virtuous if he reoe1 ves· the correct training . 
Plato gives special attention to tour virtues--temperance, 
courage , wisdom, justice. In a truly Platonic sense all 
th~se vi rtues really are one. :aut for the aa.ka of clari-
~ icat i on t1ey can be divided . Each is called s virtue be-
cause i t ts good in i teelf. T em:p ~ra.nce conai:3t s in the en-
oyment of t 1ld, gentle pleasures, and desires without 
frenzy; and, secondly, lt reaulte from knowledge of the 
good. Courage consiets also in knowledge ot what ia to be 
feared and what 1s not to be teared. This knowledge is de-
termined by reason and seasoned by temperance. Reason, it-
eel!, 1s the promoter ot order and agreement. When the 
three cardinal virtues are li!Orklng harmoniously together, 
t h en Justice, the all-embracing virtue, r~ sult s. 
Plato proves through t.iu•ee arguments that the just 
~ o ul i s ha·) )1er ths.n the unjuat one: ( , \ 
.I.. I The unjus t -oul 
is con rolled by eome mas t er pa ss i on ~nd t he b~ ~ t el ements 
wi t h l n him a r "' e nclo sed. Because o.f this haJ.;p ne e~ i s 1m• 
poss ible , for the soul 1 8 not rna !i ter of it self but a E: l~.ve 
to it s pass ions . (2) Becaus e each part of the soul ha s 
1 t s own form of plea surf' or d.estre, any one of the three 
parte--reason, spirit, or appetite--could govern. This is 
not true because there is a judge of good and better--the 
philosopher, who has exper1enoed the peculiar pleasures .or 
all three parte of the soul and whose judgment 1e bas ed on 
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re aAon and insight. (J) The th1rd proof of the just ~ 
ma n 1 13 rior1ty to happiness is based on the distinction oe-
/ 
tween pure or positive pleasures and illusory or compara-
tive pleasure. Only the wise man recognizes or is able to 
rise above the level ot comparative pleasures in order not 
to fail to distinguish between the higher and lower 
pleasures. 
The development of the good lite depends upon know-
ledge ot the virtues. Only through knowledge is happiness 
possible tor knowledge leads to the ideally perfect lite. 
The summum bonum tor man is not the absorbtion into a con-
templative realm as suggested in the Phaedo and Republic, 
nor is it the possession ot a large number ot the so-called 
"g oods• ot the world, rather it results from the develop-
ment ot character through participating in virtues as dir-
ected by reason. 
Chapter IV, which is entitled "Man and Sooi.ety, • 
makes an honest attempt to discover Plato's ideal state, 
but instead, man was discovered.- Only 1n the llte of a 
rational individual could such a state take place. However 
., 
Plato holds the state to be one ot the fundamental condi~. 
tiona of human lite and is Judging it by its moral and ed-
ucational functions. In this, the true state, the standard 
is not sheer power or foroe, but rather man as a source of 
values in the world. 
However, to develop the type ot individual desired, 
a reformation or the state is necessary. Plato outlines 
five ste~s neces sary to the transformation of the state. 
(1) First, there must be a thoroughly reorganized system of 
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education which is all inclusive. (2) The rulers must be 
philosophers 'N'ho are subject to the tra ini ng of the sta t e 
and exc ell i n a ll knowledge . (3) Thes e r ulers, a s well as 
t he gua r d ians, woulcl live in a community a nd would sha :ee 
wives, children , and good s . The merchants ' and artisa ns and 
other workers would h~v e f amily life as the y desired. 
(4 ) Equaliza tion of sexes in All things a ccording to ability. 
(5) A s cientific program of eugenics . 
Even in a n ideal sta te decline is inevitable. There 
is a f a t a l l aw which permeates the affairs of sta t e a s well 
a s those of human beings . Degenera tion follows a cycle which 
ca n be s een in the life of a person a s well a s in t he life 
of the sta te. The philosophe r feels t he pa ngs of desire 
and as Faust decides to live by a mas ter pa ssion. Such is 
t ru& of the ari s tocra ti c sta te whi 0h be comes a t1mocra tic 
one in ~·rhich the one desire is honor and mor e honor. Such 
a man c orre sponding to this government is superficia l and 
s~~a: yed by 11 cultur e 1• •.11hi 0h he kno~rs nothing about. With the 
growing \vea lth of the t~ mocratic state , more emphasi s is 
pla.ced on protection a s the s tate s lowly tur ns into a n oli-
ga r c hy. The honor-loving man of the timocra.t ic sta te becomes 
a l over of money. Whe n this happen s the a ccumulations of 
material goods be come a n end a.nd all els e mus t b e sa cr i ficed, 
even the fulfillment of other desires . Such a man will be 
at wa r with hime Alf as the oliga r chical state i s tor n asun-
der from within. When only d.es 1res rema in to control the 
125 
huma n body, necesse.vy and unnecessary appetites cannot be 
distinguished from each other . Society becomes standRr dleee 
and chaotic ae are the indiv i duals who compose it. Such an 
ind ividual, as sunh a state, is referred to a s democratic. 
Out of this confused sta nda rdlese s tate a leader a r ises. He 
persuades the helples s masses to fo l lmv him to t heir o.._.rn 
destruction. Thi s i s the worst possible sta te, a s it is the 
wor st possible d isea se the soul coul<l hav e , Such a ma n 
fears his companion s a s well as his enemi es . The mor e power 
he gains, the more miserable he become s , because he has more 
to lose a nd mor e to fe a r. Once aga in t he people will rise 
to shake of f the powe r of the tyra nt as t hey cha nged othe r 
types of governments. The cycle compl etes itself and the 
just state emerges a ga in . 
The just sta t e comes into being \orhen the thr ee 
c l asses • ..,hi eh compose i t-':'"'vorking class, gur.rdifin nl ass , and 
ruling clas s-- Jork harmoniously together. In other words , 
only when the soul of each indiv i dua l i s united by rea son. 
and he fulfills his pr oper place in s oci e ty can the i deal 
sta te become a reality. It i a not an impos s i ble task, for 
the i deal sta te can exis t within the life of a ny a nd every 
one. 
Plato' s doctrine of man is the key which unlocks the 
door of hie philos ophi c thought. Han a s Pls. to sees him is 
a cit i zen of two worlds , the Wor l d of Ideas a n the H'orld of 
AppeRr e.nces . Communication bet .,een the se. t No re EJ. lms is 
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possible only through man, who transmits values from the 
eternal real to the every day world . 
Any a ttempt to evaluate Plato's doctrine or man will 
prove inadequate, for no other single mind has influenced 
Western thinking half eo much. He presents a solid picture 
of man as he is related to the unive r se, to society, a nd to 
himself that needs little improvement, tor it takes into 
consideration the smallest to the most enormous ne eds of 
man. 
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